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TEXT AND CONTEXT: CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION AS CONTRACT DESIGN
Ronald J. Gilson,† Charles F. Sabel†† & Robert E. Scott†††
Contract interpretation remains the most important source of commer-
cial litigation and the most contentious area of contemporary contract doc-
trine and scholarship.  Two polar positions have competed for dominance in
contract interpretation.  In a textualist regime, generalist courts cannot con-
sider context; in a contextualist regime, they must.  Underlying this dispute
are contrary assumptions about the prototypical contract each interpretive
style addresses.  For modern textualists, contracts are bespoke, between legally
sophisticated parties who embed as much or as little of the contractual context
as they wish in an integrated writing and prefer to protect their choices
against judicial interference by an interpretive regime including the parol
evidence and plain meaning rules.  For contextualists, in contrast, contracts
are between legally unsophisticated parties in two prototypical settings.  The
first is the mass-market, standardized contract between sophisticated sellers
and unsophisticated consumers, who cannot bargain over contractual terms;
the second involves commercial parties doing business in a deeply nuanced
world where formal and informal understandings mix and the meaning of a
particular contract can be illuminated by the parties’ course of dealings.  For
the contextualist, willfully restricting a court’s access to information bearing
on the parties’ real relationship in both cases degrades judicial
interpretation.
We argue that the narrow focus on which prototype should apply uni-
versally has erroneously framed discussion of the parties’ choices and led to
an inconclusive and limited debate about the role of courts in contract inter-
pretation.  The range of options for parties and generalist courts is much
more diverse and variegated than the choice between ex ante party autonomy
and ex post adjudication.  We present a typology of transactional settings—
the design space for contracting—sufficiently rich to capture the breadth of
current contractual experience but sufficiently parsimonious to clarify the
central relationship between the factors that shape the design of any given
contract and the role of courts in interpreting it.  We show that design and
judicial response depends, first, on the level of uncertainty and, second, on
the thickness of the market—whether there are many traders or few engaged
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in a similar class of transactions.  The higher the level of uncertainty, the less
workable complete, state-contingent contracts become, and the more parties
develop interpretive mechanisms based on rich and regular exchange of infor-
mation on a project’s progress that allows each to gauge the other’s capacity
to define and produce a product.  The greater the number of traders engaged
in a transaction, the more likely that the interpretive regime—terms adapted
to current need—will be provided by a trade association or, given collective
action problems, a public regulator.  The interplay of uncertainty and scale
illuminates new forms of contracting among legally sophisticated parties
unanticipated in discussions of textualist prototypes and recasts the contex-
tualist prototypes as special cases that demand novel institutional responses,
including generalist courts sufficiently versed in the parties’ practices that
they resemble early courts of equity.  More generally, our analysis reveals a
surprising complementarity between public regulation and common law ad-
judication in a variety of settings.  Contractual interpretation today should
attend to today’s contracts and courts; our aim is to escape the stalemate
between textualists and contextualists and open the way for doctrine and
debate to support the novelty of contemporary contracting practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Contract interpretation remains the most important source of
commercial litigation1 and the least settled, most contentious area of
contemporary contract doctrine and scholarship.2  Framed by the
battle between the titans of contract, Samuel Williston and Arthur
Corbin, and continuing to the present, two polar positions have com-
peted for dominance in contract interpretation.  In a textualist re-
gime, generalist courts cannot choose to consider context; in a
1 Judge Richard Posner has estimated that many of the contract cases he sees present
interpretation disputes. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Inter-
pretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2005).  An early empirical study found that 25.8% of
a sample of 500 cases raised interpretation and parol evidence issues. See Harold Shep-
herd, Contracts in a Prosperity Year, 6 STAN. L. REV. 208, 222–24 (1954); see also David A. Dilts,
Of Words and Contracts: Arbitration and Lexicology, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 41, 43 (2005) (“The
construction of contract language is the controversy most evident in contract disputes.”);
John P. Tomaszewski, The Pandora’s Box of Cyberspace: State Regulation of Digital Signatures and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 417, 432 (1998) (“Most contract litigation
involves disputes over construction of the terms in a contract.”).
2 See infra notes 3–9 and accompanying text; see also infra Part I.A–B. R
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contextualist regime, these courts must consider it.  Thus, text or
context.
Underlying this dispute are contrary assumptions about the
prototypical contract each interpretive style addresses.  For the nine-
teenth-century forerunners of the modern textualists, the key proto-
type was a contract for commodity futures, a bargained-for, voluntary
agreement between fully informed and competent parties, embodying
crossed promises, at least one of which is to be executed in the future,
and establishing the idea of expectation damages derived from plausi-
ble calculations about the gains of a forgone transaction.3  Their twen-
tieth-century intellectual heirs broadened the prototypical transaction
to include all bespoke or state-contingent contracts in which the par-
ties, aided by counsel, are legally sophisticated—capable of designing
ex ante contracts that will put them in the best available position to
respond to whatever eventuates.4  Because they are able to embed as
much or as little of the contractual context as they wish in a written,
integrated contract, legally sophisticated parties are more likely to re-
sent than to welcome a court’s efforts to supplement or circumvent
their original design by its own contextual investigation.  Hence, these
sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretation, as embodied in
the parol evidence and plain meaning rules and the effect of integra-
tion, anti-waiver, and modification clauses.5  These doctrines direct
courts to look to a contract’s formal language and disregard claims,
unless anchored in the text, that the parties intended to assign con-
tract terms a special meaning revealed by the course of dealings or
other feature of the context of their relation, or otherwise intended to
supplement the formal contract by unwritten understandings and
undertakings.6
3 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 917, 936 (1974); Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369,
371 (2004).
4 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926,
957–63 (2010).
5 There are good reasons to believe that commercially sophisticated parties prefer a
regime that follows the parties’ instructions specifying when to strictly enforce formal con-
tract terms and when to delegate authority to a court to consider surrounding context
evidence. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1475, 1478 (2010).  By eliminating the risk that courts will erroneously infer
the parties’ preference for contextual interpretation, such a regime reduces the costs of
contract enforcement and enhances the parties’ control over the content of their contract.
That control, in turn, permits sophisticated commercial parties to implement the most
efficient design strategies available to them.  Ex post, preferences may change for the party
disfavored by the resolution of uncertainty, who may then prefer the right to persuade a
court of a different result.  Of course, that is the point of the ex ante focus. See infra notes
50–61 and accompanying text. R
6 A strong majority of U.S. courts continue to follow the traditional, textualist or
“formalist,” approach to contract interpretation.  A state-by-state survey of recent court de-
cisions shows that thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia follow the textualist ap-
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Contextualist interpretation, in contrast, directs courts to deter-
mine whether extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding
the contract or its performance improves understanding of what par-
ties intended regardless of the contractual text.  For contextualists,
the prototypical contractual transaction is one in which one or both
parties are, or for that contract choose to be, legally unsophisticated:
unable or unwilling to incur the expense to express their undertak-
ings in contract language, and therefore reliant on the equitable judg-
ments of courts in case of disputes.  Contextualists argue that the
court’s untrammeled authority to consider context is important in two
core prototypical settings.  The first is the mass-market, standardized
contract between sophisticated sellers and unsophisticated consumers,
who do not or cannot bargain over contractual terms.  Extending the
court’s inquiry beyond the contract’s four corners is necessary to pre-
vent such necessarily passive parties from exploitation through adhe-
sion to formal contract terms that do not reflect their real intentions.7
The second core contextualist prototype involves commercial
rather than consumer contracting.  As stressed by Karl Llewellyn and
partially reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), many
commercial parties do business in a deeply nuanced world where for-
mal and informal understandings mix in a me´lange of explicit terms
and underlying practice whose joint application to the particular con-
tract can be illuminated by the parties’ course of dealings.8  In this
setting parties who are sophisticated about their business choose to be
legally unsophisticated in the sense of avoiding ex ante design: the
stakes in any given transaction are generally insufficient to justify
bespoke contracting aided by legal counsel.  Instead, the parties pre-
fer to entrust adjudication, including determination of the details of
the contractual context, to generalist courts.  For the contextualist,
willfully restricting a court’s access to the trove of information bearing
on the parties’ real relationship degrades judicial interpretation and
frustrates these parties’ efforts to govern their transactions efficiently.9
proach to interpretation.  Nine states, joined by the Uniform Commercial Code for sales
cases and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, have adopted a contextualist or anti-
formalist interpretive regime.  The remaining states’ doctrines are indeterminate. See
Robert E. Scott, State-by-State Survey (unpublished manuscript) (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file
with author); U.C.C. §§ 2-202, 2-208, 1-205 (2014); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 200, 209 (1981).
7 See Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
8 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-202(a) cmts. 1(b), 2; 1-303 cmt. 1 (“[T]he meaning of the
agreement of the parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by their
action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding
circumstances.  The measure and background for interpretation are set by the commercial
context, which may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final
writing.”).
9 For a sampling of the scholarship supporting this view, see generally STEVEN J.
BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION (2009); Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Igno-
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And so the debate has continued: either the parties are empow-
ered to write their contracts to create desired incentives and predict-
able results without courts later assessing whether the words mean
what they say at the instance of a disappointed party, or the courts are
presumed to have been delegated the task of assessing the parties’ real
intentions in light of relevant facts that are not in the contract’s text.
Viewed in this way, the debate is not about the stark choice between
text or context but rather about who decides the appropriate mix of
text and context to use in resolving a dispute over the meaning of the
parties’ contractual rights and obligations.  The problem, however, is
that the artificially narrow focus over which of these class prototypes
should apply universally has erroneously framed the choice of the best
decision maker as either the parties themselves exercising their free-
dom to contract as they please or a common law court protecting vul-
nerable parties from erroneously imposed contractual obligations.
This is a false choice and thus the debate is inconclusive.  In fact, the
range of options for allocating decision rights in the world inhabited
both by parties designing their contracts and generalist courts inter-
preting them is much more diverse and variegated—more highly con-
textualized as it were—than the assumption that the law must choose
between ex ante party autonomy and ex post adjudication.  Properly
conceived, the mix of text and context in the particular case is best
chosen by a wide range of interpretive regimes (both public and pri-
vate)10 that function as complements to common law adjudication
rather than as antagonists.
Our goal in this Article, therefore, is to shift the focus of discus-
sion from the potential generalization of (competing) contractual
prototypes to what we call the design space for contracting: various
features in the transactional setting that dispose contracting parties to
choose a particular regime and a complementary form of adjudication
to govern their relation, rather than another.  More precisely, we pre-
sent a typology of these relations sufficiently rich to capture the
breadth of current contractual experience but also sufficiently parsi-
monious to serve as the basis for an understanding of the central rela-
rance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF.
L. REV. 943 (2009); James W. Bowers, Murphy’s Law and the Elementary Theory of Contract
Interpretation: A Response to Schwartz and Scott, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 587 (2005); Steven J.
Burton, A Lesson on Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on Contract Interpreta-
tion, 88 IND. L.J. 339 (2013); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How
the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43 (2008).
10 We use the term “interpretive regimes” to refer to the full range of non-adjudica-
tory systems that regulate the mix of text and context that will govern any particular inter-
pretive dispute.  These include private interpretive structures among individual
contracting parties, collective bodies such as trade associations, public agencies such as the
Federal Trade Commission, and, in some circumstances, general purpose courts.
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tionship between the factors that shape the design of any given
contract and the role of courts in interpreting that design.
The starting point of our analysis is the recognition that how con-
tracting parties deal with interpretation issues in designing their con-
tracts, and how courts optimally respond to the parties’ efforts,
depends on two critical characteristics of the particular contracting
environment.  The first is the level of uncertainty11—whether com-
mercial practices are stable and predictable, or disrupted by unfore-
seeable changes in technical possibilities and market conditions.  The
second is the scope, thickness, or scale of the market—whether there
are many traders or few engaged in a particular class of transaction
using similar contracting strategies.12  All else equal, the higher the
level of uncertainty, the more difficult it is for parties to write and
courts to interpret complete, state-contingent contracts.  Rather, when
the level of uncertainty is high, collaborating parties develop interpre-
tive mechanisms based on rich and regular exchange of information
on a project’s progress that allow each party to ascertain the other’s
capacity jointly to define and produce a product.  All else equal, the
greater the number of traders engaged in a transaction, the more
likely that the interpretive regime—terms adapted to current need
and a mechanism for adjusting terms as needs change—will be pro-
vided by a collective entity, such as a trade association, that can pro-
vide to a court the necessary context for interpretation.13
The interplay of these two forces—uncertainty and scale—draws
attention to new forms of contracting among legally sophisticated par-
ties unanticipated in earlier discussions of textualist prototypes, and
11 It is commonplace to follow Frank Knight and distinguish between risk—the likeli-
hood of an event that can be estimated probabilistically—and uncertainty—the likelihood
of whose occurrence, or even whether it could happen at all, that is unknown. FRANK H.
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921); see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel
& Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 433 n.2 (2009).  For a helpful discussion of how the incomplete
foresight associated with Knightian uncertainty is central to institutional (contractual) de-
sign, see Rudolf Richter, Efficiency of Institutions: From the Perspective of New Institu-
tional Economics with Emphasis on Knightian Uncertainty 17–21 (July 13, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2105604.  Also, see supra
note 120.
12 A thick market is one in which many commercial actors are exchanging goods or
services by using the same or similar contracting behaviors and strategies.  Hence the con-
tracting is multilateral.
13 In previous work, we have assessed how uncertainty and scale shape how con-
tracting parties deal with a particular manifestation of uncertainty: the design of innovative
contracts that respond to changes in the economic environment by changing existing prac-
tices to respond to the new circumstances and then stabilize these new arrangements
through a variety of institutions. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott,
Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contrac-
tual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170, 172–74 (2013).  In this Article, we generalize the central
role of uncertainty and market scale to interpretive issues more broadly.
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helps clarify the (often overwhelming) institutional demands that con-
textualist prototypes place on generalist courts.  Most of the commer-
cial contracting practices that have evolved in response to varying
levels of uncertainty and scale do not map onto any of the traditional
prototypes that have been the foundation of the current disputes be-
tween textualists and contextualists.14  Thus, for example, the design
of sophisticated information-exchange regimes to cope with high
levels of uncertainty, where parties explore the capacities of their
counterparts and the viability of joint projects, in effect abandons the
probabilistic world at the foundation of the executory contract and its
regime of expectation damages.  Here collaboration becomes the pre-
condition for determining the probabilities of success, and for this rea-
son expectation of future gain cannot be the measure of breaches of
the obligation to collaborate.15
The design space for contracting marked out by increasing levels
of uncertainty and market thickness highlights new forms of legally
sophisticated contracting, but it also recasts the contextualist proto-
types as special cases that demand novel institutional responses.
Placed in our typology, mass-market contracts with consumers—one
of the two traditional prototypes involving legally unsophisticated par-
ties—stands as a special case of contracting in thick markets under low
uncertainty.  While large and well-endowed sellers either have no
need to cooperate with others or can collude with their peers when
they do, consumers are fragmented and infrequent buyers of many
goods, and must resolve nearly insurmountable collective action
problems to secure economies of scale in contracting.  Whatever pro-
tection the state wishes to provide these isolated and legally unsophis-
ticated parties must occur, therefore, at the initial stage in the form of
interpretive limits on the design of consumer contracts.  The lessons
of scale that have motivated commercial parties to create specialized
interpretive regimes argue for a similar response to the regulation of
consumer contracts: agencies and courts working in tandem can best
assess the fairness and efficiency of non-negotiated contract terms.16
Similarly, the second prototype of legally unsophisticated par-
ties—smaller firms such as machine shops supplying numerous firms
in various industries with parts produced using the same set of flexible
machines—is in our typology a special case that straddles two catego-
ries.  On the one hand, these sellers engage in repeated dealings in
fairly thick markets: the parts are made by the same processes, often to
14 For a discussion of those prototypes and their respective normative claims, see infra
Part I.B.
15 See infra Part III.B.4.
16 See infra Part IV.A.1.  The EU’s consumer law directives—framework legislation that
must be transposed in national law by member states—are the most prominent example.
See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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similar tolerances, even if the uses vary greatly.  But transactions of the
same type with the same kind of party are too infrequent and irregular
as to warrant investments in creating and updating an industry-wide
code with precise contract terms.  On the other hand, no single trans-
action or set of transactions with a single buyer is large enough to
warrant investment in legal sophistication and an elaborate, bespoke
contract.  Hence, legally unsophisticated commercial parties in this
betwixt and between situation use standard-form documents; they typ-
ically elect to leave their agreements unintegrated and to ignore con-
flicts between forms proffered by each.17  The result is an interpretive
default that delegates to courts the decision on how best to flesh out
unwritten understandings on a case-by-case basis.
But there is virtually no evidence that courts, even those operat-
ing under the U.C.C.’s invitation to broadly examine context, actually
undertake such empirical investigations, and hence little reason to im-
agine they could succeed if they did.18  Long-term, reciprocal rela-
tions always reflect the idiosyncrasies of the histories of each party
with the others, and these idiosyncrasies prevent the community’s
practice from settling into a determinate rule.19  Thus, even if general-
ist courts were better equipped for empirical investigation than they
normally are, there will typically be no custom-based, context-embed-
ded rule for them to discover.20  Nonetheless, under certain circum-
stances—most often when judges and parties share a common
background, and meet in the resolution of broadly similar cases over
many years—courts historically, and in special cases today, have devel-
17 See infra Part IV.B.1.
18 In fact, recent research on the medieval law merchant, the formation of rules re-
garding commodity exchanges in early twentieth-century trade associations, and the cur-
rent practices of a closed community of cattle-feed traders, strongly suggest that ongoing,
“traditional” dealings never crystalize into well-defined, customary rules at all. See Emily
Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1176–77 (2012); Lisa
Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and Evidentiary Basis of
Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy 18–21 (Jan. 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) [here-
inafter Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts], available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2366533 (analyzing empirical evidence showing courts typically rely on unreliable
evidence to establish usages); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy 9–12
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 639,
2013) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy], available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2242490.  This evidence suggests that many courts, lacking expertise,
fall back instead on interested party testimony and generic concepts of reasonable com-
mercial behavior rather than a careful evaluation of complex evidentiary submissions.  The
lack of any systematic inquiry into actual practices may also reflect the fact that any context
evidence that is introduced must be evaluated in an environment of extreme moral hazard
where one party who is disappointed by fate seeks to persuade the court to shift the rele-
vant risk to the counterparty. See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. R
19 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans.,
1977).
20 See Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118–48 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 10 26-NOV-14 14:43
32 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:23
oped expertise in particular domains of commerce, and by entering
the parties’ epistemic community can create an interpretive regime
that effectively accommodates ex post review of their practices.21
The only one of the traditional prototypes that does, in contrast,
fit securely in our typology concerns commercial transactions in thin
markets at medium levels of uncertainty.  In this case, legally sophisti-
cated parties act in conformity with textualist expectations: they spec-
ify ex ante, in bespoke contracts, the mix of text and context a
generalist court should apply in its after-the-fact determination of
their respective obligations, and they rely on adherence to their in-
structions.22  But increase the level of uncertainty and the contract
becomes an interpretive framework that limits the court to sanction-
ing defections from broad, mutual commitments to collaborate.23  De-
crease, perhaps only slightly, the level of uncertainty, and increase the
number of transactors, and the contract becomes a collection of pre-
cise terms, defined and frequently updated by a trade association, and
disputes arising under it are likely to be resolved by a specialized, arbi-
tral body.24
More generally, our typology of the different interpretive regimes
that choose between text and context not only strips the traditional
contractual prototypes of general significance, but shows that general-
ist courts are, and under current conditions should be, less central to
adjudication of contract disputes than assumed by both sides in the
ongoing debate.  Our analysis strongly suggests that courts need to
acknowledge in doctrine, and contract scholars must acknowledge in
theory, what commercial parties have long recognized in practice:
generalist judges applying general, mandatory legal doctrine cannot
effectively determine the environments in which context matters.25
The evolution of the history of contract doctrine shows that the com-
mon law has lost the general capacity to successfully combine text and
context through the adjudicatory process as a substitute for a regime
of contract design.26  In contrast to early courts of equity, where the
courts were close to the actors in a largely homogenous economy,
generalist courts today are removed from the enormously varied com-
mercial contracting context in modern economies and therefore criti-
cally impaired in their ability to divine how and when parties would
braid both text and context in their contracts.  Given the variety of
situations, the limits of the generalist judiciary, and the doctrinal
21 See infra Part IV.B.
22 See infra Part III.B.2–3.
23 See infra Part III.B.4.
24 See infra Part III.C.1.
25 See generally Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts, supra note 18; Bernstein, R
Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, supra note 18, at 11–12. R
26 See infra Part II.
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logjam courts have created, it is perhaps unsurprising that sophisti-
cated commercial parties turn to specialized interpretive regimes to
accommodate text and context and to resolve their disputes reliably at
acceptable cost.27
The Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I we survey in more detail
the existing landscape of contract interpretation doctrine and scholar-
ship.  Here we show how and why the current debate came to be
framed as a contest among proponents of contrasting contractual pro-
totypes, each represented as of nearly universal significance.  We ar-
gue that the focus on the traditional text versus context prototypes
masks the way that differences in levels of uncertainty and scale shape
contemporary contracting practices.
In Part II we address history to show that generalist courts in pre-
industrial England, in contrast to today, were capable of supporting
the two contract functions at odds in current doctrinal disputes—ad-
hering to ex ante rules and updating those rules over time by combin-
ing text with context—especially when the two functions were divided
between law and equity.  With the merger of law and equity and the
embodiment of the merged doctrine in the prototype of the execu-
tory contract, the difficulty of such “unified” and universally applica-
ble modes of interpretation became apparent.
In Part III we focus on the critical roles of uncertainty and scale
in determining how legally sophisticated parties, both individually and
collectively, create interpretive regimes that determine the mix of text
and context in commercial contracting.  Here we generally endorse
the textualist claim that these commercial parties are better able than
generalist courts to decide how best to take context into account in
different environments, but we qualify that assertion by specifying the
various situations in which the resulting interpretive arrangement
deviates from the classical image of the bargained-for, state-contingent
contract.
Finally, in Part IV we focus on the unique issues raised when
legally unsophisticated parties contract.  With respect to consumer
transactions, we address the analytic and policy confusion that has
resulted from courts deploying general contract principles to address
the problems of consumer protection.  We argue that deterring rent-
seeking and exploitation requires an interpretive regime such as that
in the European Union that authorizes protection of certain interests
in particular domains and prohibits practices antithetical to those in-
terests and an orderly market generally.  With respect to legally unso-
phisticated commercial parties, we then show that the core problem is
the assumption that generalist courts are capable of both divining un-
27 See generally Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 11. R
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derlying custom and practice and applying that knowledge to the case
at hand.  We argue that the institutional knowledge that developed in
traditional courts of equity can be replicated if courts can acquire an
expertise in the relevant transactional prototypes.  However, legally
unsophisticated commercial parties who rely on generalist courts to
unpack context are subject to a measurably higher risk of judicial er-
ror: these parties inevitably trade off lower front-end contracting costs
for higher enforcement costs on the back end.
I
REFRAMING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN TEXT AND CONTEXT
IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A. The Contrasting Purposes of Contract Interpretation:
Ex Ante Contract Design Versus Ex Post Adjudication28
As we noted above, interpretation disputes are the largest single
source of commercial contract litigation.29  But despite the impor-
tance of having consistent, predictable, and efficient rules of interpre-
tation, how to interpret contracts is the least settled question in
contemporary contract doctrine and scholarship.30  This is in large
part because modern contract law is assumed to be unitary—that is, a
single set of legal rules and governing policies presumably applies to
all agreements regardless of the status of the contracting parties.
Thus, debate continues, fruitlessly, about the respective advantages
and disadvantages of textualist and contextualist theories of interpre-
tation, while the larger issues of who can best decide when and to
what extent context should supplement text in interpreting a particu-
lar contract, and hence how and by whom interpretive regimes should
be designed, are ignored.
Conceptually, “[t]extualist theories undergird the formal com-
mon law doctrines of contractual interpretation, such as the parol evi-
dence and plain meaning rules.”31  Both doctrines are designed to
give parties some control over the process courts will use to interpret
their contracts; in effect, the parties are given leeway to design their
contract by specifying whether and to what extent a court will con-
sider evidence contrary to the contract’s language.32  This interpretive
28 The discussion in this Part draws on Robert E. Scott, Text Versus Context: The Failure
of the Unitary Law of Contract Interpretation, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF
LAW 312 (Frank H. Buckley ed., 2013).
29 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
30 Id.
31 Scott, supra note 28, at 312.
32 The parol evidence rule enables parties to control the admissibility of certain kinds
of evidence in any future adjudication of disputes over their agreement.  When parties
choose to fully integrate or commit to writing the entirety of an agreement (and declare
that they have done so in a merger or integration clause), they forfeit the right in subse-
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approach, followed by a substantial majority of common law courts,33
privileges integrated contracts over context evidence that arguably
suggests the agreement contained additional or different terms or
meanings.  Textualist jurisdictions, such as New York, use a “hard” pa-
rol evidence rule that gives presumptively conclusive effect to merger
or integration clauses and, in their absence, presume that the contract
is fully integrated if it appears final and complete on its face.34  In the
same spirit, the textualist approach bars context evidence suggesting
that parties intended to impart nonstandard meaning to language
that, read alone, is unambiguous.35  From the textualist perspective,
therefore, the parol evidence and plain meaning rules are tools with
which the contracting parties can control the evidence courts will use
quent litigation to prove understandings they declined to include in their integrated writ-
ing or that, they claim, emerged in the course of performance of the agreement.  The
common law thus treats the decision to integrate an agreement as a matter of party
discretion.
Similarly, the best understanding of the plain meaning rule treats it as a device for
preserving a reservoir of terms with clear meanings that cannot be contradicted in adjudi-
cation by contextual evidence supporting a different meaning.  On this account, the plain
meaning rule makes available a public fund of terms with judicially protected meanings on
which contractual parties can rely to effectively communicate their commitments to each
other and to courts.  Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1046–48 (2009).
33 A large majority of U.S. courts continue to follow the traditional, textualist ap-
proach to contract interpretation. See supra note 6. R
34 See, e.g., Morgan Stanley High Yield Sec., Inc. v. Seven Circle Gaming Corp., 269 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 213–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the prior agreement is excluded
where the writing appears to embody a final agreement in view of thoroughness and speci-
ficity); Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 571 N.E.2d 641, 643–45 (N.Y. 1991) (same);
Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 646–48 (N.Y. 1928) (upholding the presumption and ex-
cluding evidence of collateral agreement to land sale contract).  In addition, merger
clauses are given virtually conclusive effect in New York. See Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek,
Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a merger clause provision indicates that
the subject agreement is completely integrated, and parol evidence is precluded from al-
tering or interpreting the agreement.”); Norman Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577
N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (App. Div. 1991) (“Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a
written contract containing a merger clause.”).
35 The plain meaning rule addresses the question of what legal meaning should be
attributed to the contract terms that the parol evidence rule has identified:
Contests over the meaning of contract terms thus follow a predictable pat-
tern: one party claims that the words in a disputed term should be given
their standard dictionary meaning, as read in light of the contract as a
whole, the pleadings, and so forth.  The counterparty argues either that the
contract term in question is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence will resolve
the ambiguity, or that extrinsic evidence will show that the parties intended
the words to be given a specialized or idiosyncratic meaning that varies
from the meaning in the standard language.  As with the division over hard
and soft parol evidence rules, courts have divided on the question whether
express contract terms should be given a ‘contextual’ or a ‘plain meaning’
interpretation.  Under the latter practice, when words or phrases appear to
be unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of a possible contrary meaning is
inadmissible.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 962. R
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to interpret the portion of their agreement that they intend to make
legally enforceable.
This straightforward account of the textualist interpretation doc-
trines as tools for contract design used by autonomous parties enter-
ing into voluntary, bargained-for agreements is relatively
uncontroversial.  But courts sometimes face a dilemma: maintain fi-
delity to the language and purpose of the various textualist doctrines
even when the outcome apparently thwarts the parties’ intentions as
understood ex post, or maintain fidelity to the parties’ apparent inten-
tions even though this requires the consideration of contextual evi-
dence that textualist interpretation otherwise would exclude.
Contextualist courts resolve this dilemma by deploying their equi-
table powers to avoid the application of formal contract doctrine that
yields an apparently unfair or erroneous result.  Thus, in jurisdictions
following the lead of the Second Restatement of Contracts36 and in all
contracts governed by the U.C.C.,37 contextualist theories advocate a
two-stage interpretive regime.  Under this regime, interpretive doc-
trines such as the parol evidence rule are treated merely as prima facie
guidance, which courts can (and should) override by considering ad-
ditional evidence of the context of the transaction if they believe that
doing so is necessary to substantially “correct” or complete the parties’
written contract by realigning it with its “true” meaning.  This ex post
judicial determination of the contractual obligation serves as a
fallback mechanism whenever a court determines that interpreting
contract terms according to the parties’ apparent written instructions
will fail to achieve the parties’ purposes.  Under the contextualist view,
every contract comes with a judicial insurance policy permitting the
replacement or enrichment of contract terms that, viewed in what the
court believes to be the proper context, have ill-served the parties’
intentions.38
Contextualists argue, therefore, that formal interpretive rules
that exclude certain categories of extrinsic evidence deprive the
factfinder of indispensible information relevant to deciding the case
and thus can distort the court’s assessment of what the parties meant
by their agreement.  Contextualist jurisdictions, such as California,
carry this view to its logical limit and reject the notion that words in a
contract can have a plain or unambiguous—context free—meaning at
all.  By the same logic they favor a soft parol evidence rule.  Here the
36 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 210 cmt. b; 212 cmt. b; 214
(1981).
37 See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-202 cmts. 1(b), 2; 1-303 cmt. 1 (2014).  Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all states except Louisiana, governs all “transac-
tions in goods.”  U.C.C. § 2-102.
38 See Kraus & Scott, supra note 32, at 1025. R
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test for integration admits extrinsic evidence notwithstanding an un-
ambiguous merger clause declaring the contract to be an integrated
writing or, absent such a clause, notwithstanding the fact that the writ-
ing appears final and complete on its face.39  Courts in these jurisdic-
tions “regard a merger clause as raising only a rebuttable presumption
of integration, one that is subject to being overridden by extrinsic evi-
dence that the parties lacked any such intent.”40
The debate between contextualism and textualism is intense pre-
cisely because there is a normative justification for each of the tradi-
tional prototypes that have been used as exemplars for each
approach.  In Part I.B, we set out the foil for our argument by describ-
ing these distinct justifications.  Part I.C then argues that the prototyp-
ical contractual transactions that drive the debate obscure the
diversity of circumstances that contracting parties confront in prac-
tice.  By focusing on these different circumstances we can see how the
key factors that influence contract design shape the interpretive re-
gimes that integrate both text and context.
B. Dueling Justifications
1. The Justification for Contextualism
Under autonomy theories of contract, the parties’ agreement has
normative force because the parties actually agreed to it.41  Thus, the
law’s task is to enforce the parties’ will—their freedom to contract—to
better permit realization of their goals.  These theories of contract re-
quire courts to find out, as far as is possible, what the parties meant by
the words they used.42  A contextualist approach to interpretation ap-
39 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641,
645 (Cal. 1968) (“[R]ational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of
all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties.”); Masterson v. Sine, 436
P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (admitting parol evidence to vary terms of deed on ground that
“[e]vidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is
likely to be misled”); see also Int’l Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 110 A.2d 186, 190–92
(Pa. 1955) (finding extrinsic evidence of negotiations and antecedent agreements admissi-
ble to show buyer had not assented to the contract as a complete integration of the con-
tract despite the presence of an express merger clause); 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 578 (1960) (“The fact that a written document contains one of these
express provisions does not prove that the document itself was ever assented to or ever
became operative as a contract.  Neither does it exclude evidence that the document was
not in fact assented to and therefore never became operative.”).
40 Scott, supra note 28, at 316.
41 Most autonomy-based theories are premised on either a notion of consent or the
exercise of will, such as the making of a promise.  For discussion, see ROBERT E. SCOTT &
JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 23–26 (5th ed. 2013); CHARLES FRIED, CON-
TRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 13–16 (1981); Jody S. Kraus,
Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 18 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
42 It is universally understood that a court’s role in interpreting a contract is to deter-
mine the intentions of the parties.  Intent, in turn, is determined objectively and prospec-
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pears to follow logically from this freedom of contract premise: it in-
vites courts first to learn about the commercial context and then to
interpret express contract terms in light of that context.  Implicit in a
contextual approach are two key assumptions: (1) that courts have the
capability of learning about the commercial context, and (2) that the
parties could have and would have completed the contract as the
court has done had they been able to do so at reasonable cost.
These two contextualist assumptions derive from quite separate
concerns about textualist rules of interpretation.  The assumption that
courts can accurately recover the context undergirds the “incorpora-
tion” approach to standard commercial sales contracts championed by
Karl Llewellyn and enshrined in Article 2 of the U.C.C.43  A separate
concern about the risk of fraud and exploitation in transactions with
unsophisticated parties animates the second.44  Contextualist interpre-
tations are often justified as necessary to prevent the exploitation of
legally unsophisticated individuals who enter into written contracts
with sophisticated parties who supply written contract terms that alter
previously settled understandings.  As Judge Roger Traynor famously
wrote: “[T]he party urging the spoken as against the written word is
most often the economic underdog, threatened by severe hardship if
the writing is enforced.”45  By examining the context ex post, courts
presumably are able to monitor the process by which certain terms
were reduced to writing, thereby protecting unsophisticated parties
from difficult-to-detect forms of exploitation.
tively. See Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, J.) (“A
contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the
parties.”).  In other words, a court is directed to recover the parties’ objectively manifested
intentions concerning both the objectives or “ends” of their agreement and the “means”
they may have chosen to determine those ends should they later dispute the meaning of
the agreement.
43 As noted in text, Llewellyn believed that the law should identify and incorporate
the “working rules” or governing norms already being used successfully by the parties
themselves.  Legal incorporation was necessary in order to tailor the rules to particular
practices and trade usages.  This notion of incorporation of custom and practice is deeply
imbedded in the Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-303 (2014) (permitting courts to analyze
course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, for contract interpretation
purposes).  Comment 3 of § 1-303 provides that “[usages and customs] furnish the back-
ground and give particular meaning to the language used [in the contract], and are the
framework of common understanding controlling any general rules of law which hold only
when there is no such understanding.”  In this way, Llewellyn’s article 2 explicitly invites
incorporation.  The invitation to contextualize the contract in this manner was explicitly
embodied in the Code’s definition of “[a]greement” as “the bargain of the parties in fact,
as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of per-
formance, course of dealing, or usage of trade . . . .”  U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3).  For discussion,
see Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1037–41 (2002).
44 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
45 Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
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In sum, the contextualist approach focuses on contracts between
legally unsophisticated parties who enter mass-market, standardized
transactions with sophisticated merchants (the consumer context), or
commercial contracts embedded in customary norms and terms of
trade among legally unsophisticated businessmen (the sales context).
Both of these prototypes contradict the textualist presumption of the
general availability of bespoke contracts for at least one party in the
transactional settings to which they refer.  Rather, the contextualist
regime rests on the powerful intuition that fair and efficient con-
tracting takes place in a social context, and that parties (and society)
would prefer courts to take advantage of hindsight in bringing that
context into view in a way that supports the realization of their (legiti-
mate) contractual objectives.  In this view, it seems perverse for a
court to hold parties to the apparent plain meaning of terms knowing
that those parties themselves would have rejected that meaning had
they upon formation of the contract known what the court now
knows.  Holding parties to their formally specified contract terms
when those terms no longer (or never did) reflect their shared intent
exalts formal doctrine over substance.
Despite the fact that common law courts traditionally have fol-
lowed a textualist approach, the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement
continue to encourage courts to be contextual.46  Conventional schol-
arly wisdom has long held that this interpretive approach represents a
significant improvement over the formalism of the common law.47
This is because contextualism is assumed to ascertain the parties’ in-
tentions more accurately.  More evidence usually is better than less.
Particular parties may have intended apparently clear language to be
read in a nonstandard way, or acted under the contract in ways
neither explicitly directed nor prohibited given the contractual lan-
guage.  Excluding evidence of these parties’ prior negotiations or sub-
sequent practices risks interpreting their contracts in opposition to
the parties’ actual intentions.48
46 See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202, and comments; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 210, 212, 214 (1981).  For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commer-
cial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE JURISPRUDEN-
TIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 20, at 149–92.
47 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (6th ed. 2009); see also
supra note 41 and accompanying text. R
48 Of course, the reverse could be true.  The U.C.C. directs courts to construe express
terms and extrinsic evidence from practices or usages as consistent with each other.  But
sometimes the parties may actually have intended that their clear language be read in the
standard (plain meaning) way despite the fact that the language itself conflicts with the
prior practices and negotiations of the parties.  In such a case, a court that relies heavily on
context risks misinterpreting the parties’ actual intentions.
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2. The Justification for Textualism
As compelling as it seems, however, the contextualist justification
of a two-stage regime of contract interpretation rests on an unsup-
ported central premise: that litigating parties generally want a court
“to reinterpret the formal terms of [their] written contract in light of
the surrounding context of the transaction so as to better achieve
their shared contractual purposes.”49  But there is good reason to
doubt that legally sophisticated parties typically, let alone always, pre-
fer this method of interpreting their contracts.  Rather than a rule
that always subordinates formal contract terms to ex post judicial revi-
sion, both theory and available evidence suggest that legally sophisti-
cated parties prefer a regime that follows the parties’ instructions
specifying when to enforce formal contract terms strictly and when to
delegate authority to a court to consider surrounding context
evidence.50
Textualist arguments accordingly focus on the insight that, for
legally sophisticated parties who write bespoke contracts, context is
endogenous; the parties can embed as much or as little context into a
customized agreement as they wish, and they can do so in many differ-
ent ways.51  By eliminating the risk that courts will erroneously infer
the parties’ preference for any particular contextual interpretation,
such a regime reduces the costs of contract enforcement and en-
hances these parties’ control over the content of their contract.  That
control, in turn, permits legally sophisticated commercial parties to
economize on the costs of contracting.
Textualists offer several justifications to support their claims.
First, a valuable state function is to create standard vocabularies for
the conduct of commercial transactions.52  When a phrase has a set,
easily discoverable meaning, parties who use it will know what the
phrase requires of them and what courts will say the phrase requires.
By insulating the standard meaning of terms from deviant interpreta-
tions, this strategy preserves a valuable collective good, namely a set of
49 Scott, supra note 28, at 314.
50 There is empirical evidence that most commercial parties prefer the freedom to
choose how and when to delegate discretion to courts to interpret commercial contracts.
See Miller, supra note 5, at 1478 (“New York’s formalistic rules win out over California’s R
contextualist approach.  As predicted by theory, sophisticated parties prefer formalistic
rules of contract law.”).
51 See infra Part III.B.
52 See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
847, 853–56 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, The Case for Formalism]; Alan Schwartz, Contract The-
ory and Theories of Contract Regulation, 92 REVUE D’ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 101, 102–04
(2000); Scott, supra note 46, at 157–58. R
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terms with clear, unambiguous meanings that is already understood
by the vast majority of commercial parties.53
Second, a textualist theory of interpretation also creates an incen-
tive to draft carefully.  Under a contextualist theory, a party for whom
a deal has turned out badly has an incentive to claim that the parties
meant their contract to have a different meaning than the obvious or
standard one.  Such a party can often find in the parties’ negotiations,
in their past practices, and in trade customs, enough evidence to
ground a full, costly trial, and thus to force a settlement on terms
more favorable than those that the contract, as facially interpreted,
would direct.54  Moreover, this burden of careful drafting does not
give untrammeled freedom to parties relying on the written docu-
ment to exploit mistakes or misunderstandings.  Importantly, the tex-
tualist interpretive doctrines are not self-executing.  They do permit a
court (within bounds) to exercise discretion in finding evidence of
fraud, mutual mistake, or ambiguity in the formulation of key terms,55
or even the absence of contractual obligation altogether.56
Finally, textualist interpretation permits legally sophisticated
commercial parties to economize on contracting costs by shifting costs
from the back end of the contracting process (the enforcement func-
tion) where a court would inquire broadly into context, to the front
end of the contracting process (the negotiating and design function)
where the parties specify the extent to which context will count.57  Par-
ties can do this, for example, by drafting a merger clause that inte-
grates their entire understanding, including relevant context, into the
written contract and then having the court apply a plain meaning in-
terpretation to those contract terms that are facially unambiguous.
Importantly, when parties fully integrate the agreement and use a
merger clause, an interpretation dispute over contract terms may be
53 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of
the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 286–88
(1985).  For a more philosophical examination of “plain meaning,” see SCOTT & KRAUS,
supra note 41, at 539–42; Scott, supra note 28, at 333 n.41. R
54 If a party can impeach careful contract drafting with evidence of this type, the
rewards to careful contract drafting will fall relative to the costs of such efforts.  In conse-
quence, parties will write precise, directive contracts less frequently, and the expected costs
of litigation initiated by the party disfavored by the ultimate outcome of the contract will
rise, encouraged by the chance that the court will make a mistake. See Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 584–90
(2004).
55 For discussion, see SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 41, at 420–37, 539–41, 691–93. R
56 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp., No. 1-11-CV-203163, 2012 WL 7991733, at
*27, *32 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2012) (rejecting Oracle’s claim of no contract after
considering context evidence and holding Oracle to plain language of the agreement).
57 For a discussion of how contracting parties can economize on total contracting
costs by shifting costs between the drafting or front end of the contracting process and the
adjudication or back end of the process, see generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Trian-
tis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006).
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resolved on summary judgment, thereby substantially reducing ex
post enforcement costs.58  The reduction in the chance of an expen-
sive trial, in turn, reduces the settlement value of a claim, and there-
fore the incentive for a disappointed party to pursue opportunistic
litigation in the first place.59
If instead a court decides to consider additional context evi-
dence, it must necessarily deny a motion for summary judgment and
set the case for full trial on the merits.  Thus, if litigation cost is con-
sidered, there is a strong argument that in cases where uncertainty is
low and risks can be allocated in advance, many legally sophisticated
commercial parties prefer textualist interpretation so that disputes
can be resolved without the punishing costs of a full trial and the
skewed incentives that derive from the anticipation of these costs.60
Such parties will rationally invest in sufficient drafting costs to insure
that a court interpreting the written document together with the
pleadings and briefs will be able to arrive at the “correct interpreta-
tion” more often than not.61  Here the simple comparison is between
the costs of drafting and the costs of a trial.
This description of the two approaches and their key assumptions
exposes a deep puzzle: Since the two competing approaches to inter-
pretation are supported by quite different contractual prototypes, why
do they engage in debate at all, much less struggle for supremacy?
The answer lies in their shared presumption of the unitary nature of
contract law and the mandatory nature of interpretation doctrine.
For both sides in the interpretation debate, when a court (or legisla-
ture) chooses either a textualist or a contextualist approach to inter-
pretation, that choice applies to all transactional prototypes, and
particular parties cannot choose ex ante to have their particular con-
tract interpreted according to the disfavored approach.  Thus, the
ongoing interpretation debate is not only binary—either the parties
exercise freedom to contract as they please or a court protects vulner-
58 Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 961 (“A court that uses a soft parol evidence R
rule is likely to deny a motion for summary judgment, thus increasing the expected litiga-
tion costs of both parties.”).
59 See id. at 947–51.
60 See id. at 944–47.
61 This argument is premised on the claim that firms behave as if they are risk neutral.
Assume, for example, that there is a distribution of possible judicial interpretations of a
particular contract.  A risk-neutral party wants the mean of this distribution to be at the
correct interpretation—that is, for the court to be right “on average.” Thus, risk-neutral
firms prefer to limit enforcement costs—say by resolving interpretation disputes by sum-
mary judgment—so long as the courts’ interpretations are correct on average.  It follows
that sophisticated parties (i.e., firms) are more reluctant to expend resources to shrink the
variance around the correct mean.  Conditional on the quality of the court, variance falls
as more evidence is introduced.  Thus, such parties prefer to limit the evidence that is
introduced in litigation. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 930; Schwartz & Scott, supra R
note 54, at 580. R
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able parties from error—but also winner-take-all—in any particular
“jurisdiction” victory is total for one approach or the other.62  As we
will see, however, the two approaches differ importantly in how impe-
rialist is their claim.  A textualist approach does not reject context but
instead embeds it in contract design—the parties, not the court,
choose the extent to which a court can consider context at the en-
forcement stage.  The next section shows the importance of that dif-
ference.  The two prototypes that define the text versus context
debate represent only a small part of the range of circumstances in
which issues of interpretation arise.
C. Beyond the Text and Context Prototypes: The Many Faces of
Contract and the Central Role of Uncertainty and Scale
This debate has suffered from a fundamental problem: the focus
on the traditional contractual prototypes disguises the fact that con-
temporary contract practice is far more varied and heterogeneous
than is conventionally understood either by courts or by most schol-
arly treatments.  The prototypical contractual transactions that have
defined the debate do not capture the diversity of circumstances con-
fronting contracting parties and so cannot capture the ways in which
the transactional environment influences the “contracting space”: the
wide range of institutional design choices available for both legally
sophisticated and legally unsophisticated parties to address interpreta-
tion.  Viewed in this larger frame, we can see that the choice of inter-
pretive style is distributed among a range of private and public
interpretive regimes lodged in very different institutional structures.
These interpretive regimes then function as complements to common
law adjudication rather than as antagonists.
The starting point of our analysis is the claim that two critical
characteristics of the particular contracting environment—the thick-
ness of the market and the uncertainty associated with it—determine
how contracting parties (or other interpretive bodies) deal with inter-
pretation issues in designing their contracts.  We show below in Part
III that in contracts between legally sophisticated commercial parties
these two characteristics—uncertainty and scale—influence contract
design in ways that are not captured by either the textualist or contex-
tualist prototypes.63
62 As noted above, the “jurisdictional” divide between textualist and contexualist in-
terpretive styles varies along two dimensions: First, the states themselves divide along textu-
alist and contextualist lines in their interpretation of disputes arising under the common
law of contracts.  Second, there is a further division within textualist common law states
between those disputes that arise under the common law of contracts and those that in-
volve sales transactions governed by the contextualist style of the U.C.C. See supra Part I.A.
63 See infra Parts III.A, III.B.1.
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When markets are thin and the actors few and scattered, legally
sophisticated parties design bilateral interpretive structures to govern
their relationship.  Here the level of uncertainty will determine pre-
cisely how the parties respond to the challenges of contract design.
When uncertainty is low, legally sophisticated parties in bilateral rela-
tionships can turn to bespoke contracting: by integrating the relevant
context into a complete, formal agreement they can specify precisely
the evidentiary base available to a court while still preserving the
court’s historic role in policing opportunism.64  But as uncertainty in-
creases, legally sophisticated parties will resort to an interpretive re-
gime that braids state-contingent rules with general standards that
require a context for interpretation, while at the same time guiding
the court in what context matters.65  Finally, when uncertainty is high,
bilateral contracting over product specification can break down com-
pletely; the problem is that the parties cannot specify the product that
will be produced, let alone the price or terms of sale.66  Rather, in the
process of collaboration, the parties develop interpretive mechanisms
based on rich and regular exchange of information on a project’s pro-
gress that allows each gradually to ascertain the other’s capacity jointly
to define and produce a product.67  Context thus becomes endoge-
nous: the contract process is designed to create context rather than
respond to it.  The result is a bilateral contract that specifies not the
terms of an exchange but an interpretive framework designed to dele-
gate to a court only the task of sanctioning defections from the com-
mitment to collaborate.68
Where markets are thick, economies of scale lead commercial
parties toward specialized collective regimes to resolve their disputes
or address common risks reliably and at acceptable cost.69  The
greater the number of traders engaged in a transaction, the more
likely that the contracting infrastructure will be provided jointly by a
trade association as an industry-specific public good.  When collective
action problems are severe, or when the costs to the public of break-
64 See infra Part III.B.2.
65 See infra Part III.B.3.
66 In previous work, we identified what is loosely called “the information revolution”
as the exogenous shock that marked the emergence of collaborative contracting in global
supply chains, platform production, and project development.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra
note 11, at 441.  These novel interpretive structures are used with increasing frequency in R
the search for new partners who can collaborate on joint investment in the production of
information to evaluate whether a project is profitable to pursue.  These types of bilateral
arrangements typically take the form of preliminary agreements or letters of intent, as they
are termed in the context of corporate acquisitions. See id. at 437, 457 n.67, 484.
67 See infra note 148 and accompanying text. R
68 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377,
1415–16 (2010).
69 See infra Part I.C.1–2.
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downs in contracting are likely to be high, public interpretive authori-
ties may collaborate with trade associations in providing such goods.70
In these circumstances, the parties delegate to the collective effort the
task of providing the context relevant to a dispute, and the collective
itself is legally sophisticated.  When uncertainty is low the chief goal is
to render insider understanding in terms that can be incorporated
into everyday contracting, establish specialized methods for the expe-
ditious resolution of disputes arising under these contracts, and insti-
tutionalize a process for updating terms and forms of dispute
resolution in response to  developments.  When uncertainty is high
the chief problem is not establishing the terms of bilateral exchange
but rather developing protocols that protect buyers and sellers against
hazards that could catastrophically affect them all, and that can only
be mitigated by joint efforts, as in the threat of contamination in the
commercial food chain.71
Contracts involving legally unsophisticated parties are equally in-
fluenced by uncertainty and scale but in ways that argue for special
treatment.  In the case of consumers, for example, mass markets are
thick in our typology by definition.  However, consumers must resolve
nearly insurmountable collective action problems to secure econo-
mies of scale in contracting; the promise of scale and its realization
are separated by the friction of coordination.  The lessons of scale that
have stimulated commercial parties to create specialized interpretive
regimes argue for a similar response to consumer contracts: regula-
tion can overcome the coordination costs to create interpretive re-
gimes for consumer contracting that parallel those designed by legally
sophisticated commercial parties to capture scale economies.  In con-
sumer law the EU provides the most prominent example of this type
of regime: framework legislation cabins consumer contracts from
commercial transactions and blacklists practices regarded as intrinsi-
cally unfair to the less sophisticated party.72
Similarly, the design choices of legally unsophisticated commer-
cial parties are also influenced by scale and uncertainty but in ways
that, absent exceptional institutional settings, are unlikely to optimize
contracting costs.  The merchant sellers and buyers of goods that are
the archetype of this category engage in repeated dealings in fairly
70 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization
as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265,
1276–78 (2012) (discussing the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s regime under the Perish-
able Agricultural Commodities Act).
71 See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. R
72 The role of courts in this regime is limited but critically important: courts eliminate
procedural obstacles to the vindication of these consumer rights and ensure that opportu-
nistic consumers do not game their protections to exploit traders.  See infra notes 188–95 R
and accompanying text.
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thick markets.  But transactions of the same type with the same kind of
party are insufficiently frequent and regular to justify investments in
creating and updating an industry code with precise contract terms.
Yet, neither are these parties able to bear the costs of writing elaborate
bespoke contracts for individual transactions that we observe for
larger transactions in the absence of scale.  Hence, legally unsophisti-
cated commercial parties use standard-form, prefabricated designs in
the form of invoices, purchase orders, and acknowledgment docu-
ments.  In Part IV.B we argue that the result of these constraints is to
assign the decision-making role by default to generalist courts that are
expected to be contextualist.  The dilemma is that courts are asked to
determine the operative customs and practices in a dynamic environ-
ment in which this task is, quite literally, impossible to perform suc-
cessfully.  Only in a few exceptional instances where concentrations of
similar cases create an expert judiciary do we see the emergence of an
interpretive regime capable of fulfilling the role historically assigned
to the courts of equity at common law.
In the discussion that follows, we develop this taxonomy in
greater detail.  But first we turn to history to explore how the emer-
gence of the two polar interpretive regimes from the common law
made the debate between them—in hindsight limited and even mis-
leading—long seem ineluctable.
II
THE SOURCES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
The preceding discussion underscores a fundamental normative
premise of the contextualist approach to interpretation: generalist
courts, with the benefit of hindsight, are able to determine the con-
text necessary to correctly interpret contracts.  In this Part, we argue
that the claim of generalist competence was serviceably true under
historical circumstances that no longer prevail: the early courts of eq-
uity were effectively able to contextualize contracts because they func-
tioned within highly structured communities of which they were an
integral part, and were thus likely to be knowledgeable about the con-
text surrounding any interpretive dispute that came before them.  In
effect, fifteenth-century courts of equity were specialized in the nar-
row range of activities with which they were presented.  In contrast,
contemporary courts are operating in a heterogeneous and rapidly
changing economy, of which their institutional position affords little
detailed knowledge or experience.
Historically, the English common law applied two different sets of
doctrines to interpret a disputed contract.73  The first consisted of
73 The discussion in this Part draws on Kraus & Scott, supra note 32, at 1035–45. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 25 26-NOV-14 14:43
2014] TEXT AND CONTEXT 47
rules—such as the parol evidence and plain meaning rules—cast in
objective terms that minimized the need for subjective judgment in
their application.  They were administered strictly, without exceptions
for cases in which the application of a rule appeared to defeat its pur-
pose.  These doctrines originated in the first seven centuries of adjudi-
cation in King’s Bench and Common Pleas, the English courts that
produced the corpus of the common law from the twelfth- to the nine-
teenth century.74  The second set of doctrines consisted largely of eq-
uitable principles originating in the English Court of Chancery,
which, by the end of the fourteenth century, began to exercise over-
lapping jurisdiction with the common law courts to hear cases “where
the ordinary course of law failed to provide justice.”75  These doctrines
were framed as broad principles administered loosely and were de-
signed to provide exceptions to the common law interpretive rules.
They were generally cast in subjective terms and therefore required
judges to exercise such judgment by evaluating the context of the par-
ticular transaction.76
A. The Contrasting Approaches of Law and Equity
The chancery provided an independent and alternative forum as
a response both to the procedural constraints imposed on the com-
mon law courts, and to the strict, rule-bound inclination of common
law judges to apply the common law rigorously without reference to
the context of the case.77  In short, the common law courts provided
74 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 12–14 (4th ed. 2002).
75 Id. at 117.
76 From their inception, the King’s Bench and Common Pleas Courts entertained
actions only by plaintiffs who purchased an original royal writ, which specified the type of
claim that the plaintiff was authorized to bring and the kind of relief to which the plaintiff
would be entitled should he prevail. Id. at 54.  The forms of action authorized in the writs
thus defined the content of judicially cognizable rights.  If parties had complaints that did
not fit within the confines of existing forms of action, they could petition the king himself.
Even though the King’s Bench and Common Pleas Courts were created by statute, the king
retained authority to hear cases in which he believed the common law was “deficient.”  The
king “retained an overriding residuary power to administer justice outside the regular sys-
tem; but the important limitation imposed on that power by the due-process legislation was
that it could be invoked only where the common law was deficient, and never in matters of
life, limb or property.” Id. at 98.  In exceptional cases, the king took action by granting a
remedy as of grace.  As these “exceptional” private suits became more common, they were
referred to the king’s council.  Later, parties addressed their bills directly to the chancel-
lor, who, under the authority of the council, took responsibility for assigning them to ap-
propriate courts for resolution.  The chancery always had the power to create a new writ
that would provide a form of action suitable to a plaintiff’s complaint.  But when the plain-
tiff’s claim was based on idiosyncratic facts rendering existing forms inadequate, rather
than a common complaint for which no form of action existed, the chancery sought an
ad hoc or “contextual” solution rather than the creation of a new form of action. Id. at
101–02.
77 See id. at 101–03 (explaining that chancery operated “a court of conscience” that
was free from the rigid procedures of common law courts).
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justice wholesale: common law judges “preferred to suffer hardship in
individual cases than to make exceptions to clear rules.”78  In this
sense, the common law understood its doctrines as devices for prospec-
tive regulation: as long as its rules were known in advance and the costs
of complying with them were reasonable, its doctrines should be
based on their long-term, prospective benefits, not their impact on
parties to an individual case at the time of adjudication.79
In contrast, “the chancellor’s eyes were not covered by the blink-
ers of [the rules], and he could go into all the facts to the extent that
the available evidence permitted.”80  The chancery’s sole focus was on
just and fair dispute resolution: its concern in interpretive disputes
was with the equities of the case at bar, not the prospective effects of a
ruling.  Indeed, for many years the chancery’s decrees had no formal
precedential effect,81 which initially freed the chancery from any con-
cern that its contextualized rulings could undermine the consistency
and predictability of adjudication.  Moreover, in pre-industrial En-
gland the chancery was more intimately familiar with the contextual
environment of typical party disputes and could fairly sort relevant
from irrelevant facts.  Thus, even though the chancery reversed or
avoided outcomes dictated by the formal interpretive rules,82 these ac-
tions could be seen as necessary in order to vindicate, rather than
undermine, the common law.83
Fundamentally, however, the institutions of the common law and
the chancery were at cross-purposes.  The common law viewed the ad-
judication of cases primarily as a means of creating and sustaining a
78 Id. at 102.
79 The ex ante approach of the common law courts was summarized in Waberly v.
Cockerel.  “[I]t is better to suffer a mischief to one man than an inconvenience to many,
which would subvert a law: for if matter in writing may be so easily defeated, and avoided
by such surmise and naked breath, a matter in writing would be of no greater authority
than a matter of fact.” (1542) 73 Eng. Rep. 112, 113 (K.B.); see also BAKER, supra note 74, at
325.
80 BAKER, supra note 74, at 104.  In its earliest incarnation, the procedure in chancery R
was the antithesis of the procedure in common law courts: no writ was necessary, multiple
issues could be joined, evidence was taken free of formal rules, decisions were made by a
chancellor rather than a jury, the court was always open, and trials could take place any-
where (including the chancellor’s home). Id. at 103–04.
81 “In Chancery each case turned on its own facts, and the chancellor did not inter-
fere with the general rules observed in courts of law.  The decrees operated in personam;
they were binding on the parties in the cause, but were not judgments of record binding
anyone else.” Id. at 104.  “So long as chancellors were seen as providing ad hoc remedies
in individual cases, there was no question of their jurisdiction bringing about legal change
or making law.” Id. at 202.
82 “In Chancery the just remedy was provided not by changing the law but by avoiding
its effect in the special circumstances of particular cases.” Id.
83 Councilors and chancellors viewed themselves as “reinforcing the law by making
sure that justice was done in cases where shortcomings in the regular procedure, or human
failings, were hindering its attainment by due process.  They came not to destroy the law,
but to fulfil it.” Id. at 102.
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system of rules justified by their effects over time.84  In contrast, the
chancery viewed the adjudication of cases as an end in itself, in which
the sole objective was to do justice between the parties.85  The result
was two competing systems, often with incompatible procedural and
substantive doctrines, yet overlapping in jurisdiction.86
B. Text Versus Context: The Legal and Equitable Roots of
American Contract Law
The system of equitable principles created by the chancery has
left an indelible impression on the contemporary common law of the
United States.  Historically, the division between the common law
courts and the Court of Chancery acted as a barrier between the two
incompatible regimes.  But in the nineteenth century, the chancery
was eliminated, and law and equity were merged in both England and
the United States.87  The result was an uncomfortable combination of
legal and equitable doctrines; and it was this awkward amalgam that
formed the matrix of American contract law.
To this day, therefore, American contract law is torn between the
prospective interpretive perspective of common law rules and the ret-
rospective dispute-resolution perspective of equitable doctrines.88
This tension is embodied in the rules governing the interpretation of
contracts.  The contract interpretation doctrines originating in the
English common law courts included the fundamental protections of
textualism, the plain meaning89 and parol evidence90 rules.  But along
with these rules, American contract law also absorbed doctrines origi-
nally developed in the chancery “to mitigate the rigours of the Com-
mon law.”91  These included equitable doctrines specifically inviting
the court to rely on the factual context of the particular dispute in
84 Id. at 13 (explaining that the common law system employed the position that “over
and above everything stand the pleas of the royal court, which preserves the use and cus-
tom of its law at all times and in all places and with constant uniformity” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
85 Id. at 104.
86 See id. at 102–03.
87 Ironically, by the nineteenth century, the chancery had developed a set of proce-
dures more arcane and burdensome than the common law procedures it originally sought
to mitigate.  The resulting administrative delay, combined with corruption born of the
chancery’s practice of paying clerks on a fee basis rather than salary, ultimately led to the
chancery’s demise.  Soon thereafter law and equity were merged. Id. at 111–12, 114.
88 For an example of the continued tension between law and equity in an integrated
judicial system, see infra notes 240–49 and accompanying text (describing the continuing R
tension between the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court).
89 The common law applied “to documents a rule of construction that the words had
to be given their ordinary meaning.” BAKER, supra note 74, at 226. R
90 See id. at 324–25.
91 DAVID J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 203
(1999).  In general, equity evolved contract doctrines designed to provide far broader pro-
tection against perceived fraud than the common law provided.  In particular, the core
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derogation of the common law rules of interpretation.92  Conflicts are
inevitable among doctrines that require courts to be both generalists
and specialists in resolving disputes across a heterogeneous con-
tracting population.  Thus, the text versus context tension is baked
into the merger of law and equity.
The struggle between the common law rules of interpretation
and the equitable exceptions to those rules was rationalized, at least
formally, by Samuel Williston, the author of one of the great twenti-
eth-century treatises, into a purportedly coherent set of general rules
(and exceptions) that could be applied predictably by common law
courts.93  Willistonian formalism rested on several basic claims: that
contract terms could be interpreted according to their ordinary mean-
ing, and that written terms have priority over unwritten expressions of
agreement.94  Williston viewed merger clauses as presumptively estab-
lishing a total integration of the agreement sufficient to exclude ex-
trinsic evidence.95  In the absence of a merger clause, he argued that
if the writing appeared to be a complete instrument, it should be
found to be a total integration unless additional terms offered by the
counterparty were those that might naturally be included in a separate
agreement covering those terms.96  These views on parol evidence had
a significant influence on the doctrines adopted by many state courts
as they decided interpretation disputes, and Williston’s formalist ap-
proach to interpretation was subsequently enshrined in the First Re-
statement of Contracts.97
But the tensions between law and equity persisted just beneath
the surface of the newly unified law of contract.  They were elevated to
prominence by the legal realists under the leadership of Arthur
Corbin and Karl Llewellyn.  Corbin advanced the view that the Willis-
tonian rules governing interpretation were legal fictions and that,
properly understood, all interpretation issues were context specific.98
equitable contract doctrines provided relief where an agreement was not fully voluntary or
informed. See id. at 208.
92 See, e.g., WILLIAM STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 153–57 (W.E.
Grigsby ed., 1884) (describing the equitable exceptions to the parol evidence rule).
93 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 631 (3d ed. 1961) (“[The parol evidence] rule re-
quires, in the absence of fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or something of the kind, the
exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or written, where the parties have reduced their agree-
ment to an integrated writing.”).  For discussion, see Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith,
Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169, 186–88 (1990).
94 See Patterson, supra note 93, at 186–88. R
95 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 33:3.  For discussion, see PERILLO, supra note 47, at R
115–16.
96 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 33:25.
97 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 240 (1932).
98 See Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 188–90 (1965).
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In his view, courts did (and should) apply rules tactically in order to
pursue overarching policy—metaprinciples of fairness and natural jus-
tice.  In the case of an interpretation dispute, the just result was to
determine the actual intention of the contracting parties.99  Accord-
ing to Corbin, in order to properly capture this intent, all relevant
evidence should be considered on any interpretive issue.100  Procedur-
ally this meant the very evidence whose admissibility was being chal-
lenged would be admissible on the issue of whether or not the parties
intended the writing to be a total integration.  Indeed, Corbin argued,
this result was unavoidable: the very judgment as to whether particular
contract language was sufficiently unambiguous as to exclude consid-
eration of extrinsic evidence required consideration of just that evi-
dence.101  Corbin’s approach severely undercut the application of the
traditional parol evidence and plain meaning rules.  Adjudication, he
believed, could not reach a fair result unless the court considered the
context of the transaction.102
Llewellyn advocated a similar commitment to context, although
he located the metaprinciple that courts must apply in the common
“working rules” found in the practices of commercial parties.103  The
course of prior dealings between the parties, together with the usages
in the trade, formed the implicit background for the explicit contracts
between merchants practicing within any particular commercial com-
munity.  Moreover, the actual course of performance under the agree-
ment was the best evidence of the meaning the parties attached to
their written contract.104  But since the working rules arose from cus-
tom and practice their jurisdiction was uncertain: they needed the
imprimatur of the state.  Legal incorporation was necessary, therefore,
in order to tailor the rules to particular practices and to resolve the
troublesome cases where the relevant norms were in dispute.105
99 6 CORBIN, supra note 39, § 577 (1951).
100 See Corbin, supra note 98, at 188–90. R
101 6 CORBIN, supra note 39, § 582.
102 Corbin’s view was that even if a contract was an unambiguous integration, all rele-
vant extrinsic evidence should be admissible on the issue of the meaning of the agreement,
including the evidence of the parties’ subjective intentions. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 39,
§§ 24.7–24.9 (Kniffin 1998); Corbin, supra note 98, at 162, 188–90. R
103 Llewellyn was committed to the idea of filling contractual gaps with default terms
that mimicked the arrangement most (or at least many) commercial parties would have
made for themselves.  In his mind, the solution to the dilemma of the poor fit between
overly broad legal default rules and complex commercial relationships seemed straightfor-
ward.  Rather than use abstract, general standards to regulate these relationships, the law
should simply identify and incorporate the “working rules” already being used successfully
by the parties themselves. See Scott, supra note 43, at 1023–24. R
104 See e.g., U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 1 (2014) (“The parties themselves know best what they
have meant by their words of agreement and their action under that agreement is the best
indication of what that meaning was.”).
105 Scott, supra note 43, at 1023–24; ROBERT E. SCOTT & GEORGE G. TRIANTIS, FOUNDA- R
TIONS OF COMMERCIAL LAW 15 (2010).
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This notion of incorporation of custom and practice was deeply
imbedded in article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, of which
Llewellyn was the principal drafter.  Here, “Llewellyn addressed the
incorporation objective by reversing the [Willistonian] presumption
that the parties’ writings . . . [were] the definitive elements of the
agreement.”106  Rather, the Code invited contextualization by defin-
ing an agreement as “the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in
their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course
of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade . . . .”107  In addi-
tion, the new parol evidence rule under the Code admitted inferences
from trade usage even where the express terms of the contract
seemed perfectly clear and were apparently “integrated.”108
Unlike Corbin, however, Llewellyn believed that customary prac-
tice had only an epistemological and not also a normative rele-
vance.109  Indeed his reservations about generalist courts were similar
to our own,110 and he was thus unwilling to rely solely on their intu-
itions to undertake what was essentially an empirical inquiry.  Since
Llewellyn’s purpose was to incorporate the actual context that com-
mercial parties had developed through their practices, he needed a
mechanism by which these local norms could be identified by courts.
In his mind, that mechanism was the merchant tribunal, made up of a
panel of experts that would find specific facts—such as whether the
behavior of a contracting party was “commercially reasonable” in the
context of the particular dispute.111  Unfortunately, the idea of the
merchant tribunal was too radical for the commercial lawyers who
dominated the U.C.C. drafting process.112  Ultimately, Llewellyn aban-
doned this key device for discovering the relevant context, while still
retaining the architecture of incorporation.113  As many have sug-
gested, eliminating the merchant jury while retaining the pervasive
106 Scott, supra note 43, at 1038.
107 U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2014).
108 See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmts. 1–2.
109 See Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE JURISPRU-
DENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 20, at 12, 15–19.
110 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 13, at 175. R
111 See, e.g., Revised Uniform Sales Act § 59 (Second Draft 1941) (“The procedure laid
down in the sections attempts . . . to open the submission of peculiarly mercantile ques-
tions of fact to skilled specialists.”).  The merchant tribunal was competent to opine on the
effect of any mercantile usage on the terms of a contract, “[t]he mercantile reasonableness
of any action by either party,” and “[a]ny other issue which requires for its competent
determination special merchants’ knowledge rather than general knowledge.” Id.
§ 59(1)(c), (d).  For discussion, see Scott, supra note 43, at 1040–41. R
112 Scott, supra note 43, at 1040.
113 See id. at 1040–41; James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on
Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 174–75 (1988).
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notion of incorporation of commercial norms was a serious drafting
mistake.114
And so, the battle between text and context persists to our day
under a nominally unified law of contract that applies its interpreta-
tion principles—whether text or context—to all contractual settings.
The common law courts have proved remarkably faithful to Willis-
tonian textualism.  A large majority of courts retain “hard” parol evi-
dence and plain meaning rules while recognizing equitable
exceptions for fraud, misrepresentation, and the like.115  In these ju-
risdictions, the risk is that unsophisticated parties may be trapped by
the textualist rules that work well in facilitating contract design by so-
phisticated commercial parties.  At the same time, a minority of courts
have adopted Corbin’s commitment to context, and in sales law the
U.C.C. remains fully committed to Llewellyn’s incorporation pro-
ject.116  This commitment remains firm even though the evidence is
that courts generally have not attempted the empirical inquiry that
Llewellyn believed essential to the success of the interpretive mis-
sion.117  In short, rather than a set of interpretive doctrines that work
to facilitate party preferences, we are left, instead, with the worst of
both worlds.
In the next two Parts, therefore, we shift the focus from ex post
contract interpretation to ex ante contract design in order to accom-
modate the two major deficits in the current doctrinal regime: (1) the
failure of generalist courts to perform successfully as arbiters of con-
text in disputes between commercial parties, and (2) the failure of a
114 See Whitman, supra note 113, at 174–75; Scott, supra note 43, at 1040–41; Zipporah R
Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 465, 505–06 (1987).
115 See Scott, supra note 6. R
116 See id.
117 As noted, the “incorporation mechanism” introduced by Llewellyn has not func-
tioned as he intended. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  Llewellyn intended the
key instruction to courts—that they focus on commercially reasonable merchant prac-
tices—as a direction to admit expert evidence of the contracting customs of particular
trades and then announce default rules that would apply to those particular populations of
commercial parties.  But the abandonment of the merchant tribunal doomed this effort
from the start. Courts have subsequently interpreted these statutory instructions not as
directions to incorporate specific commercial norms and customs but rather as invitations
to use context as a source of subjective meaning—a determination of what the specific
parties to the particular dispute “must have meant” by their agreement.  This exercise
sometimes results in reformation of the apparently clear express terms of the contract;
other times it leads courts to decline to enforce commercial contracts in the face of appar-
ently clear contractual language to the contrary.  Scott, The Case for Formalism, supra note
52, at 854–55, 858–59; Imad D. Abyad, Note, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn’s R
Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429, 452 (1997) (“The courts in effect
are abrogating the responsibility that the Code drafters assigned to them by treating com-
mercial reasonableness as garden-variety reasonableness, left for the lay juries to decide on
a case-by-case basis with no systematic structure resulting from their decisions.”); Bernstein,
Trade Usage in the Courts, supra note 18, at 20–21. R
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unitary law of contract to apply its doctrines successfully to both le-
gally sophisticated and unsophisticated contracting parties.  We first
show in Part III that legally sophisticated commercial parties choose
the appropriate mix of text and context by crafting interpretive re-
gimes that work in a complementary fashion with ex post adjudication
so long as courts attend to the environment in which particular parties
design their contracts.  Interpretation becomes a matter of design, not
doctrine.  Commercial contractors designing bespoke contracts com-
bine both text and context but in very different ways depending on
the levels of uncertainty they are facing.  When markets are thick and
commercial parties can design contracts collectively, they are able to
standardize the context and develop modes of interpretation that per-
mit these standard understandings to be updated periodically, in ef-
fect endogenizing through design the process that Corbin sought
through adjudication.
In Part IV we consider disputes where one or both of the parties
are legally unsophisticated.  Here we distinguish between consumer
transactions on the one hand, and commercial transactions among
parties for whom high transaction costs preclude them from choosing
ex ante contract design on the other.  As we will see, contextualization
by expert courts works well as a design choice for commercial transac-
tions among such legally unsophisticated parties.  However, generalist
courts have largely failed to accomplish the twin goals of (a) protect-
ing consumers from difficult-to-detect forms of exploitation and
(b) capably using context evidence to resolve disputes between legally
unsophisticated commercial parties.
III
TEXT AND CONTEXT IN THE DESIGN OF CONTRACTS BY
LEGALLY SOPHISTICATED PARTIES
A. Choosing the Contract Form that Specifies the Role of
Generalist Courts
The history of contract doctrine shows why common law courts
have lost the capacity to combine text and context successfully
through the adjudicatory process.  In contrast to early English courts
that were embedded in a homogenous economy, generalists courts
today are removed from the particular contracting context and there-
fore impaired in their ability to divine how and when parties would
braid both text and context in their contracts.  Moreover, the merger
of law and equity has placed doctrines that traditionally worked in
tandem, albeit separately, in fundamental opposition one to the
other.  Contemporary textualist and contextualist theories thus strug-
gle for control of this tattered institutional setting, each claiming the
right to govern different transactional paradigms, knowing that,
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under current doctrine, rules of interpretation are understood as
mandatory and not subject to party choice—one size will be applied to
all.  Given the variety of situations, the limits of the generalist judici-
ary, and the doctrinal logjam, it is perhaps unsurprising that legally
sophisticated commercial parties turn to creative contract design to
accomplish two objectives: first to provide clear instructions to courts
as to the appropriate mix of text and context; and, second, in light of
those instructions, to invite courts to retain their historic superintend-
ing role to guard against opportunistic behavior.
In this Part, we present a typology of the conditions under which
legally sophisticated commercial parties design contracts to accom-
plish their objectives.  We characterize transaction settings on two
dimensions.  The first is the level of uncertainty118—whether commer-
cial practices are stable and predictable, or frequently disrupted by,
and thus needing to adapt to, changes in technical possibilities and
market conditions.  The second is the scope or thickness of the mar-
ket—whether there are many traders or few engaged in a particular
class of transaction.  All else equal, the higher the level of uncertainty,
the more difficult it is for parties to write, and courts to interpret,
state-contingent contracts.
B. Designing Bespoke Contracts Under Varying Conditions of
Uncertainty
1. The Tradeoff Between Front-end and Back-end Contracting Costs
In general, legally sophisticated parties designing bespoke con-
tracts choose between text and context by trading off the front-end
(or drafting) costs of contracting and the back-end (or enforcement)
costs.119  The fulcrum of this balance between front-end text and
back-end context is the level of uncertainty.120  The scale of the partic-
ular contractual setting—that is, the thickness of the market—dictates
118 As stated in supra note 11, we follow Frank Knight and distinguish between risk and R
uncertainty.
119 For discussion, see generally Scott & Triantis, supra note 57. R
120 Risk and uncertainty are a continuum, where any particular transaction will present
elements of both risk and uncertainty but in different proportions.  For expositional pur-
poses, we will treat the term “low uncertainty” as covering situations in which probabilistic
assessments can be made in important respects, and we will use the term “high uncer-
tainty” for circumstances where probabilistic assessments are of little consequence.  Thus, a
high level of uncertainty exists when exogenous events that may affect the parties’ obliga-
tions to perform are unknown or cannot be estimated probabilistically.  Conditions of high
uncertainty—generally the product of an exogenous shock—can occur in either bilateral
or multilateral markets.  In high uncertainty environments, where future contingencies
cannot be estimated and parties must adapt collaboratively, the contracting process itself
reflects continuous uncertainty.  In that sense, uncertainty is endogenous to the contract.
Under conditions of low uncertainty, sophisticated contractors can identify relevant risks
that may impede future performance, estimate their occurrence probabilistically, and allo-
cate those risks in the resulting agreement.
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the institutions or interpretive regimes through which this tradeoff is
determined or influenced.121
Writing a complete (or state-contingent) contract that specifies
ex ante the outcome in each future state of the world significantly
reduces ex post enforcement costs by dramatically reducing (if not
eliminating) the need for courts to inquire into context.  Such a con-
tract not only provides the court with a clear and complete statement
of the parties’ obligations, but by reducing factual inquiry it also
reduces the likelihood of opportunistic litigation driven by moral haz-
ard on the part of the losing party.122  Where both obligations and
performance are observable and verifiable as in a complete contract,
the likelihood of a court making a mistake in interpreting the con-
tract is reduced and, correspondingly, so is the incentive for the party
disfavored by the contract’s outcome to engage in the litigation in the
first place.  Fidelity to the contractual text thus reduces the need for
resort to context to address unanticipated events, as well as the oppor-
tunity for a losing party to exploit the court’s discretion by seeking to
persuade it to reallocate losses assigned to the losing party by the con-
tract.  In the setting of a state-contingent contract, therefore, courts
are less mistake prone and parties less likely to encourage mistakes,
resulting in less enforcement uncertainty and cost.
But the greater the uncertainty associated with a contract—the
more difficult for the contracting parties to specify all the future states
of the world in which the contract will have to be performed and the
actions to be taken in each of those states—the more the contracting
parties confront a dilemma.123  They can choose specific rules cover-
ing possible outcomes, but in the face of uncertainty this approach
comes at the cost of an increased likelihood that the ex ante–specified
state contingencies will turn out to be incomplete or simply wrong
ex post.124  With this level of uncertainty, the parties may be better
served by using a standard-based measure of performance—commer-
cial reasonableness, for example—rather than detailed but incom-
plete or erroneous state-contingent rules.125  Because a court applies a
121 A thick market is one in which many commercial actors are exchanging goods or
services by using the same or similar contracting behaviors and strategies.  In this respect,
similarity should be understood as a continuum.  As we will see, broadly similar transac-
tions may still have significant idiosyncrasies, which will influence how a multilateral con-
textualizing regime addresses markets that are thick at a general level and thinner with
respect to particular transactions. See infra Part III.C.2–3.  The polar opposite—a thin mar-
ket—exists when each contracting party must negotiate a bespoke agreement with its
counterparty. Here contracting is bilateral.
122 See infra notes 129–34 and accompanying text. R
123 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 68, at 1390–91. R
124 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1099 (1981).
125 See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. R
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standard only after future events have occurred, the court will have
more information, including the actual context of performance, than
did the parties when they wrote the contract.  As uncertainty in-
creases, consideration of the context of performance in interpreting a
standard thus has the potential to improve the accuracy of the out-
come of any litigation, although with a concomitant increase in ex-
pected litigation costs.  So the greater the ex ante uncertainty, the
potentially more important the ex post resort to standards and there-
fore to context, but with the increased potential for judicial mistake
and opportunistic-motivated litigation.  This tradeoff directly influ-
ences how the parties design their contracts so as to optimize the
front-end and the back-end costs of contracting.
As we will see, three characteristics of the contracting process
complicate the relationship between uncertainty and the parties’
choice of an interpretive regime that determines how much discretion
to delegate to a court to ascertain and apply context ex post.  The first
is that the subject matter of the contract affects the extent to which
judicial discretion over context increases enforcement costs.  Where
the subject matter of the contract makes the relevant context both
observable and verifiable, the parties can more easily specify the rele-
vant context, and courts are less likely to make an error in applying a
standard in resolving litigation.
Second, the experience and expertise of the court or other adju-
dicative body that must determine and apply the relevant context af-
fects the back-end costs of contracting, in particular the possibility
that the court will make a mistake and, hence, the incentive for the
disadvantaged party to pursue litigation.  This experience and exper-
tise, in turn, is a function of scale: the larger number the number of
parties contracting over the same range of activities, the more likely
courts will develop experience and expertise, which to some extent
reduces the risk of error and thus of moral hazard–based litigation.
As well, the larger the number of parties contracting over similar
transactions, the more feasible it is to have collective determinations
of context other than by means of formal adjudication, as through the
adoption of industry standards or other joint efforts.126
Finally, the relationship between uncertainty and the decision to
delegate discretion to a court is not monotonic.  At some point, uncer-
tainty becomes so pervasive that the parties cannot anticipate or spec-
ify the relevant context ex ante even through the invocation of broad
standards of reasonableness and the like.  Here the back-end costs of
litigation, and especially the potential for moral hazard, then become
so large that sophisticated parties forgo both text and context with
126 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 13, at 176–77. R
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respect to their substantive relation by resorting to collaborative con-
tracting and other novel contract forms.127  These new forms of con-
tracting, which we have documented extensively in our earlier
work,128 function to confine the courts’ ex post discretion.  By using
radically incomplete contracts as a means of limiting a reviewing
court’s jurisdiction to the commitment to collaborate rather than ex-
tending to performance of any substantive obligations that grow out
of the collaboration, the parties rely entirely on informal mechanisms
to enforce any contractual performance obligations.
2. Low Uncertainty and Few Parties: The State-Contingent Contract
Setting
When uncertainty is low, sophisticated parties, even when acting
in bilateral relations, can come close to designing a regime that em-
bodies a complete contingent contract—the discrete contract setting
in legal terminology.129  Of course, we observe few circumstances
where bespoke contracting can be this prescient.  However, parties
that are confident that they can approximate this ideal design con-
tracts that specify dispute resolution by a generalist court but with
clear instructions to confine interpretation to the text of the agree-
ment.  Because these parties can anticipate the context in which per-
formance will occur, the contract itself will reflect it.  Discursive
exposition of goals, expectations, and business plans, whether in the
contract’s preamble or in particular sections, can supplement precise
specifications of outcomes while still constraining a court’s discretion
to range more widely than the parties want.  Consider, for example,
the design choices open to sophisticated parties who wish to embed
relevant context in their agreement.  These parties can (and do) cre-
ate a bilateral interpretive regime that provides clear directions to a
court of the context within which the contract should be inter-
preted.130  Such a regime might include (a) “whereas” or “purpose”
clauses that describe the parties’ business plan and the transaction;131
127 See infra notes 145–50 and accompanying text. R
128 See generally Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 13; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note R
68. R
129 The categorization in contract law scholarship of discrete versus relational contract
is generally attributable to the work of Ian Macneil. See generally Ian R. Macneil, The Many
Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1018 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW.
U. L. REV. 85 (1978).
130 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 954–55. R
131 For example, see the following “purpose” clause from the Fountain Manufacturing
Agreement between Apple Computer, Inc. and SCI Systems, Inc. (May 31, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter Apple/SCI Manufacturing Agreement], available at http://contracts.onecle.com/ap
ple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml:
PURPOSE
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(b) definition clauses that ascribe particular meanings to words and
terms that may vary from their plain meaning;132 and (c) appendices
that provide more precise specifications governing performance, as
well as any memoranda the parties want an interpreting court to con-
sider in interpreting the contract’s text.133  Alternatively, the parties
can specify in the agreement that the meaning of terms should be
interpreted according to the customs and usages of a particular trade
or industry.134  Casual empiricism suggests that legally sophisticated
commercial parties who write customized contracts that incorporate
different mixtures of text and context pursue all of these strategies in
one degree or another.
The contractual designation of context is not the only technique
available to these contracting parties in a low uncertainty environ-
ment.  Sometimes the difficulty in proving (verifying) the relevant
context to a court can present a barrier to incorporating context in
the written contract.  Under these conditions, the parties can design
an interpretive regime that uses options to overcome the nonver-
ifiability of the relevant context.135  For example, consider a research
contract between a large pharmaceutical company and a small bio-
Apple and SCI entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement on April 4, 1996
(the “Stock Purchase Agreement”) pursuant to which SCI will purchase Ap-
ple’s manufacturing facility located at 702 Bandley Drive, Fountain, Colo-
rado (“Fountain”) and certain related assets.
The parties desire that Apple engage SCI to assemble, test and package
certain Products, Service Units and Spare Parts, as defined below, on a turn-
key basis at Fountain on the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
This Agreement defines the general terms and conditions governing all
transactions between them for Products, Service Units and Spare Parts man-
ufactured at Fountain.  Individual “Product Plans” attached as Addenda to
this Agreement, and incorporated herein by reference, define the specific
terms and conditions for each Product, Service Unit and/or Spare Part.
The initial Product Plans are attached to Exhibit A and numbered A-1
through A-11.
Additional Products and Product Plans may be added to this Agreement by
addenda to Exhibit A signed by both parties.  Such addenda will be num-
bered sequentially, A-12, A-13 and so on.
In consideration of the above and the mutual promises contained herein,
Apple and SCI agree as follows[.]
132 See, e.g., Data Management Outsourcing Agreement between Allstate Insurance
Company and Acxiom Corporation, art. 2 (Mar. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Allstate/Acxiom
Outsourcing Agreement], available at http://contracts.onecle.com/acxiom/allstate.out
source.1999.03.19.shtml (defining, in the “definitions” clause, thirty-four technical or non-
standard meanings, including specialized meanings of “Agreement,” “Confidential Infor-
mation,” “Data Integrity,” “Current Projects,” “Affiliate,” “End-User,” “Material Default,”
“Party,” “Person,” “Problem,” “Term,” “Work Order,” and “Work Product”).
133 See, e.g., Apple/SCI Manufacturing Agreement, supra note 131, art. 22 (providing a R
list of general terms ranging from the relationship of the parties to complete agreement).
134 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 54, at 585–86. R
135 See Josh Lerner & Ulrike Malmendier, Contractibility and the Design of Research Agree-
ments, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 214, 214–16 (2010).
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technology company where the parties may both know and be able to
observe the relevant context a court should apply, but be unable to
specify that context in the agreement.  In this case, options can pro-
tect the pharmaceutical from two types of opportunistic behavior by
the biotech in providing the contracted-for research.  First, the bi-
otech, which typically has a number of research projects with other
companies as well as proprietary research, may be tempted to use the
contractual payments to cross-subsidize other projects, to the disad-
vantage of the pharma and its project.  Second, the concern is that the
biotech will be disproportionately benefited from academic research
vis-a`-vis the pharma and will underinvest in the commercially oriented
research desired by the pharmaceutical in favor of investments in aca-
demic research.136
Here the problem is not uncertainty—both parties know and un-
derstand the object of the contract and the desired inputs to perform-
ance.  The uncertainty relates only to output.137  In this circumstance,
the biotech can be policed by granting the pharmaceutical an uncon-
ditional option to terminate the relationship and secure broad prop-
erty rights to the research output on payment of a termination fee.138
The termination fee, in turn, constrains responsive opportunism by
the pharmaceutical company.  This use of options may viably substi-
tute for the ex ante incorporation of context in a low uncertainty envi-
ronment because the inputs that may be subject to opportunism are
fully observable by the contracting parties even if not verifiable to a
court.139
3. Context and Contracting with Moderate Uncertainty: Bilateral
Contracts with Standards
Now suppose the contracting parties confront moderate uncer-
tainty, such that they can identify what should happen in some but not
every future state of the world.  One clear example is the hiring of a
specialized agent, say a sales representative.  The parties can specify
what they want the agent to accomplish as matters stand at the time of
drafting the contract: they can identify the category of product and
136 See, e.g., Walter W. Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Indus-
try, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 197, 211–12 (1996) (“Building on pre-
existing ties of its scientists, a company makes gains through cooperation.”).
137 Lerner and Malmendier posit that opportunistic behavior by the biotech is observa-
ble but not verifiable—the pharmaceutical company will know when the biotech is skewing
the use of the invested funds or the orientation of the project, but will not be able to prove
the misbehavior to the court. See Lerner & Malmendier, supra note 135, at 240. R
138 See id. at 238–39.
139 As we will see, however, an interpretive regime based on options is unlikely to suc-
ceed in a high uncertainty environment where it may be difficult or impossible to deter-
mine which party will be in a position to act opportunistically, and thus it will be unclear to
whom the option should be allocated. See infra Part III.B.4.
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customer, or geographic region, and they can specify sales goals.  But
they cannot detail how the agent will try to market the product, how
the agent will allocate her time across different products, or what ad-
justments the agent should make if market conditions change or com-
petitors alter their strategy, perhaps in response to her activity.
Similarly, the party charged with securing regulatory approval and
commercializing a new drug under a license from the owner of the
intellectual property is typically charged with using “commercially rea-
sonable efforts” to accomplish these tasks,140 reflecting the fact that
the appropriate strategy is dependent on the sequential outcome of
uncertain events, including the results of clinical tests, the path of the
regulatory process, and competitive conditions—what other drugs
have entered the market—by the time that interpretive approval is
secured and commercialization can begin.
In this range of uncertainty, parties combine precise terms—
state-contingent rules—and contractual standards that carry with
them directions about the context through which the standard should
be applied.  In the sales examples, and in other circumstances when
one party contracts for the counterparty’s expertise, the ultimate aim
of the contract is to secure the counterparty’s active exercise of judg-
ment.  When circumstances change in an unanticipated way the
agent’s obligation is to apply her expertise to adjusting effectively to
the new conditions.  This form of relationship is memorialized in a
formal contract by the use of a standard such as best efforts: a
characterization rather than a specification of the contracted-for
performance.
Commercial contracts often include both precise rules and gen-
eral standards, and courts actively interpret and enforce such stan-
dards by reference to context evidence.  For example, contracts may
state one party’s performance obligation as to make “commercially
reasonable efforts,” “reasonable efforts,” or “reasonable best ef-
forts.”141  In terms of the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post con-
tracting costs, the use of a standard as opposed to a rule necessarily
increases ex post contracting costs.  It is harder to verify performance
when specified by a standard; the court must first identify a “proxy”
against which to measure performance, an intermediate step that is
140 See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Norms, and International Intellectual Property Law, 28
MICH. J. INT’L L. 109, 149 (2006).
141 See Univ. of Mo.-Columbia, CORI Contracts Library, CONTRACTING & ORGS. RESEARCH
INST., http://cori.missouri.edu (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (total contracts in CORI
database: 24,965; contracts with “best efforts” terms: 4,328 (17.34%); contracts with “rea-
sonable expenses” terms: 2,584 (10.35%); contracts with “reasonably withheld” terms: 38
(0.0015%); contracts with “unreasonably withheld” terms: 3,525 (14.12%); contracts with
“reasonable” terms: 13,281 (53.20%)).
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not required when the contract specifies the terms of performance.142
For this reason, disagreement over whether a performance standard
has been met is much less amenable to pretrial resolution than is a
rule, and the potential for moral hazard—the party disfavored by the
change in circumstances opportunistically misleading a court into
reallocating the burden of events in its favor—is increased.
Under these conditions of moderate uncertainty, standards also
have special utility.  Courts assess performance with respect to stan-
dards only after the relevant future events have occurred.  Thus par-
ties can obtain the advantage of hindsight: at the time for dispute
resolution, the court has information that at the time of drafting the
contract the parties lacked.  Thus, here the parties design an interpre-
tive regime that combines rules and standards so as to optimize the
admissibility of context evidence over two dimensions: when the court
will look to context and who decides what context matters.143  The
combination of general and specific terms, therefore, offers sophisti-
cated contracting parties the ability to combine the text with context
evidence that is revealed over the course of contract performance.144
The more effectively context can be harnessed to resolve uncertainty
in the judicial application of contractual standards, the more attrac-
tive the use of standards that take advantage of the court’s better in-
formation ex post.
When, and the extent to which, parties design a regime that de-
ploys broad standards depends on a particular form of uncertainty—
how effectively context can be used to reduce the risk that a court will
(or can be persuaded to) misunderstand or misapply the standard.  As
discussed earlier, the outcome will depend in the first instance on the
subject matter of the contract and the industry, and on the surround-
142 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 68, at 1390.  The use of a proxy results in a con- R
tractual version of the Heisenberg uncertainty effect in physics.  In physics, the problem is
that measuring one attribute of a phenomenon reduces the observer’s ability to measure
the other attribute.  In contracting, using a proxy to measure one attribute causes the
observed party to reduce provision of a complementary attribute that is not being
measured.
143 At the time of contract formation the parties have a comparative advantage over
courts in setting the interpretive mix since the parties share the benefits of efficient con-
tracting; at the time of subsequent litigation, however, the court will have the benefit of
hindsight.  Uncertainty has been resolved, and the court sees realized facts rather than
probability distributions.  Because the parties cannot foresee all contingencies, they can
delegate to the court the task of completing the contract ex post by considering relevant
context.  They indicate this intention by adopting a general contract term—a standard—
that directs the court to limit its efforts to recovering only that context evidence relevant to
the particular obligation embedded in the contractually specified term. See Scott & Trian-
tis, supra note 57, at 843–45. R
144 The options available to the parties are even broader than the stark choice between
a rule and a standard.  With the aid of interpretation maxims, parties can design combina-
tions of specific and vague terms that more precisely define the “space” within which the
court has discretion in proxy choice. Id. at 848.
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ing circumstances.  At one end of a continuum, if the subject matter,
industry, and surrounding circumstances are themselves clear enough
to narrow the context that will appear relevant to a reviewing court,
the parties will need to do little more through drafting beyond a refer-
ence such as “commercial reasonableness.”  Alternatively, at the draft-
ing stage the parties can specify in greater detail the context that will
be relevant—what industry, what kind of products, and, when possi-
ble, even the relevant proxy the court should use to measure perform-
ance under the standard.  In both cases, the contractually specified
standard directs the court to make use of context in addition to text,
but limits its inquiry into context to that relevant to the particular
obligation embedded in the standard.  As with bespoke contracting
under conditions of low uncertainty, the parties in designing the con-
tract choose the interpretive regime—the balance between text and
context that best suits the level and kind of uncertainty the transac-
tion protects.
4. Collaborative Contracting
What happens when uncertainty is high but traders are few, and
their relations are of necessity idiosyncratic?  Here the thinness of the
market motivates the parties to create bilateral interpretive regimes
for exploring possibilities for collaboration without creating intolera-
ble mutual vulnerability to opportunism.  Neither textual nor contex-
tual interpretation is helpful since under high uncertainty the parties
themselves can neither set prospective rules to govern their conduct,
nor even specify the relevant context by which conduct might be as-
sessed.  This solution to this problem is exemplified by what we have
elsewhere called “contracting for innovation.”145  In these circum-
stances, parties are contracting over the creation of something whose
features, and the contributions of each of the parties, are unknowable
and will emerge only after many iterations between the contracting
parties.  Moreover, this uncertainty will not be resolved by the passage
of time, as is the case where a court can use context to apply a stan-
dard after events have resolved uncertainty.  Rather, the uncertainty is
continuous; the object of the contracting process will continue to
evolve and new elements of uncertainty arise to replace those that
have been resolved.146
Thus, when uncertainty is high and continuous, the parties can-
not trade off between ex ante and ex post contracting costs.  No stable
ex post period arises in which standards can be used to fill in uncer-
tainty-driven gaps in an incomplete formal contract.  The contracting
problem then is to craft a structure that is neither state-contingent nor
145 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 11, at 435. R
146 See id. at 448–51.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 42 26-NOV-14 14:43
64 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:23
standard-based, and that (a) induces efficient, transaction-specific
investment by both parties; (b) establishes a framework for iterative
collaboration and adjustment of the parties’ obligations under condi-
tions of continuing uncertainty—circumstances when the resolution of
one element of uncertainty merely gives rise to another; and (c) limits
the risk of opportunism that could undermine the incentive to make
relation-specific investments in the first place.147
The common challenges facing parties designing collaborative in-
terpretive regimes give rise to solutions with common elements: the
parties design an interpretive structure that braids formal and infor-
mal contracts in a fashion that is neither state-contingent nor stan-
dard-based, because it does not address performance of any
substantive obligations at all.  In general, the formal contract is pro-
cess- rather than outcome oriented.  It defines a process of collabora-
tion—typically a regime of ongoing review and information exchange
by which the parties mutually evaluate their capacities and inten-
tions—that substitutes functionally for ex ante specification of the de-
sired product by building trust that responds to the fact that
specifications are the outcome of contracting for innovation not an
input.148  Thus, in sharp contrast to contracting in low uncertainty en-
147 See id. at 455–58.
148 For a sample of collaborative contracts that combine formal and informal ele-
ments, see Allstate/Acxiom Outsourcing Agreement, supra note 132 (contract for Acxiom
to develop a data-acquisition system to support Allstate’s underwriting of new business in
auto and property insurance); Agreement between Phoenix Technologies Ltd. and Intel
Corporation (Dec. 18, 1995), available at http://contracts.onecle.com/phoenix-tech/intel
.supply.1995.12.18.shtml (supply contract for Phoenix to be a principal supplier of system-
level software to Intel); General Terms Agreement between The Boeing Company and
Spirit Aerosystems Inc. (June 30, 2006) (on file with authors) (general terms agreement
covering purchase orders by Boeing for particular product to be supplied by Spirit); Com-
ponent Supply Agreement between American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. and General
Motors Corporation (June 5, 1998) (on file with authors) (requirements contract for mo-
tor vehicle components to be supplied by AAM to GM); Development Agreement between
Nanosys Inc. and Matsushita Electric Works, Ltd. (Nov. 18, 2002), available at http://con-
tracts.onecle.com/nanosys/matsushita.rd1.2004.02.08.shtml (collaboration agreement to
develop photovoltaic devices with nano components in Asia); Apple/SCI Manufacturing
Agreement, supra note 131 (contract manufacturing agreement for SCI to produce desig- R
nated products at the Fountain, Colorado, plant); Research, Development, and License
Agreement between Warner-Lambert Co. and Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Sept. 1, 1999)
[hereinafter Warner-Lambert/Ligand Agreement], available at http://contracts.onecle
.com/ligand/warner.rd.1999.09.01.shtml (pharmaceutical research and development col-
laboration between “big pharma” and “little pharma”); Collaboration and License Agree-
ment between Pharmacopeia, Inc. and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (Nov. 26, 1997)
[hereinafter Pharmacopeia/Bristol-Myers Squibb Agreement], available at http://contracts
.onecle.com/alpha/471.shtml (same); Long Term Agreement between John Deere &
Company and Stanadyne Corporation (Dec. 14, 2001) [hereinafter John Deere/Stanadyne
Agreement] (on file with authors) (five-year supply contract for the purchase of fuel filtra-
tion systems, injection nozzles, and related products by Deere from Stanadyne); Airbus
A320 Purchase Agreement between AVSA, S.A.R.L. and New Air Corporation (Apr. 20,
1999), available at http://contracts.onecle.com/jetblue/airbus.a320.1999.04.20.shtml (Jet-
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vironments, the process, if successful, defines the specification, not
the other way around.  In each case, the parties make relation-specific
investments in learning about their collaborator’s capabilities and the
nature of the project that raise the costs of switching to new partners,
and so restrain either party from taking advantage of their mutual
dependence.149
Accordingly, the parties designing a collaborative contract craft
an interpretive regime in which, despite—indeed, because of—the
high uncertainty, there is no role for a court to incorporate context in
resolving disputes between the parties.  The uncertainty exists with re-
spect to whether a product in the end will be developed, whether ac-
tual sales will result, and how the parties will continue to interact in
the future.  But because the uncertainty concerning these matters is
so high and continuous, the parties do not contract over outcomes at
the outset; there is no substantive set of contractual obligations for a
court to enforce.  Rather, the parties design the collaborative process
to build switching costs through formally specified process-based
learning, and then rely on informal enforcement mechanisms for sub-
stance.  Put differently, in the face of high and continuous uncer-
tainty, resolving disputes over the obligations that arise out of this
relationship cannot be delegated to generalist courts; the parties cre-
ate their own means of enforcing their commitments to each other
through a contractually specified process.  The effect of this design
framework is to limit judicial oversight to sanctioning “red-faced”
abuse of the process-oriented regime—i.e., the secret misappropria-
tion by one party of knowledge gained in the collaboration to another
venture—without inviting a court to convert the exploration of collab-
orative possibilities into a contractual obligation to actually do so.150
Blue and Airbus purchasing agreement); see also George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets
and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 100, 103–05 (2009) (citing examples of collaborative
contracts).
149 The collaborative contract does not, however, commit either party to develop, sup-
ply, or purchase any product since by definition the product that may come out of the
collaborative process cannot be specified at the outset.  So how do the parties address the
purchases and sales that ultimately will result from a successful collaboration?  That com-
mitment emerges from the resulting trust relationship, where the barrier to ex post oppor-
tunism results from increased switching costs generated by the collaboration process itself.
Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 11, at 484. R
150 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Techs., Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 668, 696–97 (S.D.
Ind. 2006) (holding that the contractual remedy for breach of a collaborative agreement is
limited to the right to terminate and retain accrued scientific information); Medinol Ltd.
v. Boston Scientific Corp., 346 F. Supp. 2d 575, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that the par-
ties’ close collaborative relationship and Boston Scientific’s stealth and secrecy showed it
had acted in bad faith by setting up an unauthorized manufacturing line); Shaw v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 226 A.2d 903, 906–08 (Vt. 1967) (affirming a damage award
for breach of an implied covenant not to use a patent beyond the scope of license).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 44 26-NOV-14 14:43
66 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:23
5. Summary
In this Part, we have described how legally sophisticated parties
contracting over a discrete transaction design interpretive regimes
that specify the mix of textual and contextual interpretive elements,
and so the extent to which generalist courts are delegated the role of
applying context in interpreting the contract.  The parties do not
choose text or context.  Rather the parties choose the mixture of text
and context that fits the underlying transaction, ranging from (a) be-
spoke state-contingent contracts that reject any ex post context; to (b)
contracts that combine precise terms with general standards that a
court will interpret ex post subject to the parties’ specification of the
context the court should apply; to (c) contracts where the very point is
to specify a collaborative process through which the parties will create
the context that supports the subsequent informal mechanisms that
will govern their substantive obligations going forward.  We have
shown that the specific mix of text and context the contracting parties
choose is driven by the impact of uncertainty on the tradeoff between
the ex ante and ex post costs of contracting.  Text and context, not
text or context.  Figure 1 stylizes the relation between uncertainty and
these contracting parties’ resort to generalist courts to apply context
to contractual interpretation.  As noted above, this relationship is not
monotonic.
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At low levels of uncertainty, parties will exclude ex post judicial
resort to context.  The gain in precision from filling small gaps in con-
tractually specified contingencies with broad standards to be applied
ex post by courts is outweighed by the moral hazard–based incentive
to litigate that results from the realization of adverse events.  As uncer-
tainty increases such that the parties can specify the goal but not the
steps that must be taken to achieve it, nor the accommodations that
would be required by changes in the commercial environment, resort
to standards—like commercial reasonableness—that invite judicial ex-
plorations of context becomes compelling.  Here, by crafting the ref-
erence to context in a fashion that focuses the court’s inquiry,
whether through the substance of the contract or the clarity of the
relevant industry, the parties can get the benefit of judicial hindsight
but with limits on the cost of litigation.  Since the success of moral
hazard–motivated litigation depends on the court making an interpre-
tive mistake, the expertise and experience of the court reduces the
likelihood of mistake and hence the incentive to bring such litigation.
Thus, resort to better courts expands the range of uncertainty over
which the parties can rely on judicially interpreted standards.  Finally,
as uncertainty becomes fully Knightian, and state-contingent con-
tracting becomes close to impossible rather than merely gap-ridden,
reliance on generalist courts to interpret context drops dramatically;
the parties’ formal contractual arrangement then focuses on specify-
ing a collaborative process, the goal of which is to create the context
that will support the informal mechanisms of trust that will regulate
the actual provision of goods and services.
C. Designing Contracts with Scale Under Varying Degrees of
Uncertainty: Multilateral Interpretive Regimes
As the number of parties contracting over similar transactions in-
creases, the range of interpretive options available to the parties in-
creases.  With scale, knowledge of the relevant context is located in
the parties and not readily accessible to a generalist court whose
knowledge must necessarily come through the litigation process.  As
we saw in Part II.B, this is the setting that concerned Karl Llewellyn,
where generalist courts simply could not access the collective knowl-
edge held by numerous parties of the context in which they acted and
hence could not determine the context necessary to interpret con-
tracts.151  Llewellyn’s response to generalist courts’ information disad-
vantage was to substitute a merchant jury for the court as the vehicle
for applying context.  We show in this section that Llewellyn had the
problem right but the answer wrong.  Rather than mandating a partic-
151 See supra notes 103–14 and accompanying text. R
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ular mechanism by which the relevant market’s collective knowledge
of context could be extracted, we observe that, as with bespoke con-
tracts, the parties themselves determine the collective interpretive re-
gimes by which context is applied to their contracts.  And as with
bespoke contracts, the design of these collective mechanisms is impor-
tantly a function of the level of uncertainty associated with the particu-
lar category of transaction.
1. Low Uncertainty and the Problem of Judicial Ignorance
Take first the setting where trade practices are stable and well
understood by a substantial community of traders.  Uncertainty is low,
as with bilateral state-contingent contracts, but markets are thick.
Here the presence of scale allows an approach different from bespoke
contracts: the key contract design choices are made collectively.  The
contracting parties act through trade organizations and similar collec-
tive entities that can take advantage of scale economies to formulate a
contractual design that reduces contracting costs for all the individual
members of the community.  But despite the regularities of dealings,
and the trading community’s easy familiarity with their particulars and
the distinctive vulnerabilities to which they can give rise, a generalist
court cannot reasonably be expected to have knowledge of trade prac-
tices or be able conveniently to obtain it.  The problem here, in other
words, is that a generalist judge is and will remain ignorant of the
common knowledge of the trade.  The key design strategy, therefore,
is to render insider understanding in terms that can be incorporated
into everyday contracting, establish methods for the expeditious reso-
lution of disputes arising under these agreements, and institutionalize
a process for keeping terms and forms of dispute resolution abreast of
developments.
In “The Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes,” Hart and Sacks de-
scribe, under the name of an “institutional settlement,” just such a
collective regime for the regulation of contracting in perishable agri-
cultural commodities.152  The regime was initially created to address a
disruptive practice (the “rejection evil”) that recurrently threatened
commerce in these goods: when prices fell against them, buyers
evaded their commitments by using minor nonconformities as pre-
texts to reject—as we have seen, this is the standard move by the party
who has been disadvantaged by the resolution of uncertainty.  Small
shippers were typically unable to salvage rejected goods or to pursue
litigation in distant locales.  The dispersed and fragmented character
of the industry impeded efforts, over decades, to address the problem
152 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 10–68 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
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through coordination of private trade associations.  In 1930, Congress
passed the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), which
makes it a violation of federal law for “any dealer to reject or fail to
deliver . . . without reasonable cause any perishable agricultural com-
modity” in an interstate transaction.153  The Act instructs the Secretary
of Agriculture to promulgate regulations to guide interpretation of
contract terms allocating risks specific to the industry between buyers
and sellers, to operate an arbitration process to adjudicate claims at
reasonable costs, and to administer a licensing scheme to screen irre-
sponsible buyers and sellers from the industry.154  Here the strategy is
to use legislation as a coordinating mechanism, which had been
lacking.
In the case from which the problem was derived, a Springfield,
Massachusetts, wholesaler rejected an extensively spoiled shipment of
melons that did not satisfy the contractual specification and aban-
doned the cantaloupes at the loading dock in Springfield, from where
the railroad eventually disposed of them for salvage value.155  The Chi-
cago broker who sold the fruit sued for the contract price.  The dis-
trict court, disregarding the PACA regime, treated the case under the
general law of sales, and held that the buyer’s obligation to the seller
for the purchase price could be reduced by the decrease in value
caused by the cantaloupes’ nonconformity.156  Prior to the adoption
of the U.C.C., the common law of sales was ambiguous as to whether
the seller’s shipment of nonconforming goods permitted the buyer to
reject, instead of accepting and claiming damages for their reduced
value; whether, if there was found to be a right to reject, the rejecting
buyer had a duty to assist the seller by disposing of the spoiled goods;
and whether the buyer’s failure to salvage or wrongful rejection led to
offsetting damages or a complete forfeiture of the purchase price.
The common law thus seemed to lack the necessary resources for ef-
fectiveness in this domain.157
The court of appeals reversed the district court decision on the
ground that the buyer had forfeited his right to offsetting damages by
failing to salvage.158  Because forfeiture was developed by the Depart-
153 Id. at 33 (quoting Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) of 1930 § 2(2),
7 U.S.C. § 499b(2) (2012)).
154 See id. at 33–36.
155 Id. at 10–68.
156 See id. at 50–53 (quoting Joseph Martinelli & Co., Inc. v. L. Gillarde Co., 73 F. Supp.
293 (D. Mass. 1947)).
157 The problem of lost value by inefficient salvage is largely solved in the U.C.C. See
U.C.C. §§ 2-603, 2-604 (2014).  The problem of opportunistic rejection is only partially
solved by § 2-508.  For discussion, see generally Jody S. Kraus, Decoupling Sales Law from the
Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, 104 YALE L.J. 129 (1995).
158 See HART & SACKS, supra note 152, at 57–58 (quoting L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Marti-
nelli & Co., Inc., 169 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1948)).
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ment of Agriculture, under PACA, as a key to elimination of the rejec-
tion evil, the court properly deferred to the institutional judgment of
the collective entity that had designed the contract.  The determina-
tion of context is made by the collective mechanism, not by a general-
ist court.159
As Lisa Bernstein has shown in well-known studies of contracting
in the cotton, grain, and diamond industries,160 collective regimes of
this kind frequently arise through private organization, and disputes
arising within them can be disposed of by private arbitration.  But
public or private, dispute resolution in these regimes is “textualist”:
parties are expected to incorporate standard language into their con-
tracts, and are held to its terms.  Claims of a pattern of dealings that
diverges from the text are summarily rejected.  This formalism is work-
able for two reasons.  First, it is underpinned by an interpretive re-
gime providing for the updating of formal standard terms through
periodic consultation with the transaction parties—a collective mech-
anism to determine context.  Second, parties routinely diverge from
the formal terms of the contract—indeed, there is a course of dealings
that does diverge from the text.  However, the arbitrators’ application
of textualist interpretation relegates divergence from the text to infor-
mal relational contracting supported by a reputation mechanism.  If
the parties feared that the arbitrators would take informal adjustments
into account, they would be unwilling to make them.161  Thus, it is the
interpretive regime and the informal adjustment mechanisms that it
fosters, and not the arbitral body, that does the contextualizing.
2. High Uncertainty and the Problem of Joint Risk Mitigation162
Consider next the setting of high uncertainty and thick markets.
This domain has not been as prominent in the study of contracts as
the preceding one, but for reasons we have discussed elsewhere it is
159 Note that judicial deference should be limited to matters related to collective deter-
mination of context.  In contrast, generalist courts should not hesitate to overrule the Sec-
retary in order to protect buyers from seller fraud or sharp practice.  In short, generalist
courts’ expertise is superior in matters involving possible opportunism, as opposed to de-
termination and interpretation of context.  This is precisely the oversight role that general-
ist courts properly play in support of sophisticated contracting parties, where the courts are
not at a systematic information disadvantage.  The successful maintenance of a collective
interpretive regime requires parties to design a contractual structure that impels generalist
courts to adopt a combination of deference and oversight.
160 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771–77 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD.
115, 119–30 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745–54 (2001)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry].
161 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 13, at 203–04. R
162 The discussion that follows draws on our previous work, id. at 210–13.
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rapidly increasing as a matter of practical concern.163  The problem
here is not the same as a generalist court’s ignorance of established
understanding or practices, as in the low uncertainty case.  Under
conditions of high uncertainty both generalists and insiders are un-
sure about what the solution might be.  The aim of this interpretive
regime is therefore not the elaboration and codification of established
knowledge to which a generalist court does not have access, but rather
the organization of collective exploration of possibilities for problem
solving, especially the mitigation of risks that can only be addressed
through exacting, common efforts by all market participants.  Here, as
in the case of bilateral collaborative contracting, the role of the gener-
alist court in interpretation is limited to policing opportunistic efforts
to evade the collective commitment.
Food safety illustrates the class of risk that motivates the forma-
tion of this type of collective contractual design.  As the supply chains
for foodstuffs lengthen and ramify, pathogens can enter in innumera-
ble and rapidly changing ways that are very difficult to trace.  Unde-
tected, food contamination is rapidly propagated by processing
(through mixing of foodstuffs and secondary contamination of equip-
ment), and then disseminated through extensive distribution net-
works.  Since the failure of any actor to scrupulously adhere to the
good practices can undo the efforts of all the others, adhesion to the
requirements of the regime will be a precondition to contracting in
the market.
The California Leafy Green Products Handler Marketing Agree-
ment (LGMA) is an exemplar of a collective regime of this type.164
Leafy greens became a salient concern after highly publicized disease
outbreaks from tainted spinach and lettuce in 2006.165  Leafy greens
pose particular risks because they are often eaten raw (cooking kills
most micropathogens) and because these vegetables, produced in
larger scale operations than in the past, are often sold in “salad mixes”
that mingle pieces picked in different locations, thus multiplying the
163 Id. at 210–11.
164 See California Leafy Green Products Handler Marketing Agreement (Mar. 5, 2008),
available at  http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/mkt/mkt/pdf/CA%20Leafy%20Green%20Products%
20Handler%20Agreement.pdf.  The state of California recognized the LGMA under the
authority of a state marketing act that confers antitrust immunity on organizations of agri-
cultural producers for various purposes. See id. art. XI.  There are currently about 120
members, accounting for about ninety-nine percent of California leafy greens production.
See FAQ, LGMA, http://www.lgma.ca.gov/about-us/faq/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).  There
is a parallel regime in Arizona. See Arizona Leafy Green Products Shipper Marketing
Agreement (Sept. 30, 2011), available at http://www.arizonaleafygreens.org/arizona-leafy-
greens-shipping-agreement-2012/.
165 See Shermain D. Hardesty & Yoko Kusunose, Growers’ Compliance Costs for the Leafy
Greens Marketing Agreement and Other Food Safety Programs 2, UC Small Farm Program Re-
search Brief (Sept. 2009), available at http://sfp.ucdavis.edu/files/143911.pdf.
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possibilities for cross contamination.  Federal food regulation has fo-
cused traditionally on post-farm industrial processing where there is
less uncertainty concerning the source of contamination, and was ill
prepared to address the numerous “critical control points” on the
farm by which pathogens could enter this food chain.
The LGMA designates safety standards or “best practices” for the
farms from which the handlers buy.166  These standards require grow-
ers and processors to prepare plans identifying hazardous control
points, detailing the measures undertaken to mitigate the risk, and
reporting the results of tests verifying the efficacy of these measures.
The LGMA additionally requires each handler to maintain records
that permit identification of the farm and field from which all compo-
nents of its products originate should contamination later be discov-
ered.167  The members commit to deal only with farms that comply
with the standards.  As in the case of the low uncertainty regimes dis-
cussed above, the ultimate sanction for noncompliance is suspension
or withdrawal of a recalcitrant member’s right to use a service mark,
and thus temporary or permanent exclusion from the industry.168
As in our previous examples, the success of the LGMA and the
durability of the collective collaboration among industry participants
demonstrates how relatively unsophisticated commercial parties, such
as the growers of leafy greens, can take advantage of economies of
scale to design a legally sophisticated interpretive regime: this regime
assigns to the industry group the responsibility for establishing the
baseline of standards of behavior and processes, and assigns to courts
the more limited role of identifying significant deviations from that
baseline in particular cases.169
166 See California Leafy Green Products Handler Marketing Agreement, supra note
164, art. III(A)(3).
167 Id. art. IV.
168 Id. art. V(D).
169 The 2010 federal FDA Food Safety Modernization Act reinforces the mechanisms
embodied in the LGMA.  FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353,
§§ 102–05, 201–05, 301–07, 124 Stat. 3885, 3923, 3953 (2011) (amending the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to have more stringent, detailed, and preventive require-
ments).  The Act mandates that each food-processing facility develop, implement, monitor,
validate, and update a plan for hazard control.  Id. § 103.  The Act also directs the Food
and Drug Administration to set standards for fruits and vegetables, id. § 105(a), and “[i]t
seems clear that such standards will be developed in a way that relies on organizations like
LGMA” to continue and advance the joint exploration of risks and possible mitigations on
which this type of regime depends.  Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing
Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering,
110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1284–85 (2012).
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3. High Uncertainty with Moderate Scale: The Delaware Court of
Chancery
Consider now the setting where there are a large number of
highly complex transactions that share general features, but where
each transaction has significant idiosyncrasies, and the common back-
ground conditions shift rapidly.  This is the setting in which, for exam-
ple, the legal rules governing the obligations of boards of directors in
corporate acquisitions are applied.  The uncertainty arises not from
the unforeseeable, unintended consequences of incorporation of new
actors, products, and production processes into a highly interdepen-
dent, if not joint, endeavor—as in maintaining the safety of a food
supply chain.  Rather the uncertainty arises through the strategic in-
teraction of corporate actors intent on manipulating open-ended
rules in volatile environments to advance their private interests.  On
the one hand, the parties know the general rules that apply, but on
the other hand, also know that the other will seek to exploit those
rules to its advantage.  To the extent that actors in such an environ-
ment take collective actions to reduce the very uncertainty to which
they contribute, with the complementary aim of reducing the chance
of judicial error in ex post application of standards like fiduciary duty,
they will need to rely on expert judges with significant experience in
the field: to rely, that is, on a specialized court of equity.  The speciali-
zation of the court and its equitable powers assure parties that, despite
the impossibility of codifying decision rules, judicial decisions will be
taken with the fullest possible awareness of current understandings of
good practice, that is, the court can with reasonable accuracy assess
the context because it is part of it.  Thus, the chancery court applies a
standard—fiduciary duty—to assess the parties’ behavior.  The special
advantage of the chancery court, as we saw in Part III.B.1, is that a
court’s experience and expertise expands the range of uncertainty
over which a standard effectively trades off between ex ante con-
tracting costs and ex post enforcement costs.170
One way to understand why a majority of U.S. public corpora-
tions choose Delaware as an incorporation state is that it serves to allo-
cate to the Delaware Court of Chancery jurisdiction to resolve
fiduciary duty issues.  Delaware corporate law is enabling, that is, it
gives corporations wide latitude to adopt specific rules governing their
behavior; organization design is left to the parties just as is contract
design in a textualist interpretive regime.  In fact, Delaware corpora-
tions appear not to accept that invitation, writing articles of incorpora-
tion and bylaws that largely address formal issues like meeting dates,
because a corporation’s circumstances and the evolution of the mar-
170 See supra Part III.B.4.
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ket for corporate control are too uncertain to specify ex ante conduct
rules that will govern all of the corporation’s activities in the future.171
So all ex ante rules governing formal issues are subject to ex post
court review of the context because the parties can be expected to
manipulate those rules to their advantage when circumstances make it
to their advantage to do so.  Formal compliance with ex ante rules
thus remains subject to ex post court review through a standard—the
director and officer’s overriding obligation of fiduciary duty.172  Like
contracting parties operating under uncertainty, a corporation assures
that as circumstances reveal ex post gaps in its articles of incorpora-
tion and bylaws as a result of uncertainty, they will be filled by a stan-
dard applied by a court with the expertise to reduce the likelihood of
error.  This is accomplished by incorporating in a jurisdiction that has
sufficient scale of incorporations that its judges develop the necessary
experience and expertise.173  In this respect a modern court of equity
resembles the early English courts of equity—the chancery court has
deep knowledge of the community whose disputes it resolves, as did
the early courts of equity with respect to the homogenous economy in
which their litigants operated.
Both the cost and benefit of delegating to a court or other arbiter
the task of assessing context ex post goes up with uncertainty; but the
shape of the curve in Figure 1174 is based on the expectation that in-
creased uncertainty more than proportionately increases the cost of
the decision to delegate discretion to courts, as the uncertainty erodes
natural constraints on judicial misuse of context and the incentive for
moral hazard–based litigation.  However, increasing the quality of the
adjudicator can increase benefit relative to cost and thus shift the
shape of the relationship between uncertainty and resort to context.
In short, an expert court extends the range of uncertainty over which
a standard-like fiduciary duty can operate effectively.
It is at this point that a collective decision to choose the same
forum has an ironic impact: it allows the parties, by choosing the adju-
dicator, actually to reincarnate Llewellyn’s concept of the merchant
171 See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?: Anti-
takeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 87 (2001).
172 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circum-
stances in Which it is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v.
Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877, 882 (2005) (describing Delaware’s judiciary as being known
for its “use of [the equitable principles of fiduciary duty] to restrain otherwise lawful con-
duct”).  Those familiar with the common structure of chancery court opinions will recall
that there is uniformly a lengthy and very detailed account of the facts—who negotiated
with whom, what did they say, etc.—in cases that apply a fiduciary standard.
173 See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 14–17
(2006); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 845–47 (1995).
174 See supra Part III.B.5.
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jury, the very judicial sensorium that had been eliminated from the
U.C.C.  To add irony to irony, the only judicially based interpretative
regime that fully reflects Llewellyn’s vision is not found in contract law
but in Delaware corporate law where, coming full circle, the central
player is a court of equity.
IV
TEXT AND CONTEXT IN TRANSACTIONS WITH
LEGALLY UNSOPHISTICATED PARTIES
At the outset, we sharply distinguished between the application of
doctrinal rules of contract interpretation to the contracts of legally
sophisticated and legally unsophisticated parties.175  With respect to
the interpretation of legally sophisticated commercial contracts, we
have argued that, properly understood, textualist interpretation does
not prohibit resort to context by generalist courts in interpreting com-
mercial contracts.  Rather, textualist interpretation empowers con-
tract design—the parties design interpretive regimes to prescribe the
mixture of text and context that reflects the level of uncertainty and
scale presented by their transaction.  But legally unsophisticated par-
ties by definition do not design contracts.  Consumers, for example,
play no role in the design of the contracts covering their transactions,
and the parties who do design them may have exploitation of consum-
ers as one of their goals.  As we have seen, in important respects a
central justification of a mandatory contextual interpretive regime is
precisely to shift the contract design function from a legally unsophis-
ticated individual to a generalist court, just the opposite of the appro-
priate interpretive regime for sophisticated commercial contracts.
Yet the application of a contextualist interpretive regime to con-
sumer transactions makes the same mistake for these transactions as it
did for legally sophisticated commercial contracts: it assigns the de-
sign function, and hence the choice of the best mix of text and con-
text, to the wrong party.  To be sure, a generalist court is better than
empowering an exploitive contract designer, but we argue in this Part
that a simple assignment of the contract design function in consumer
transactions to a generalist court is also wrong.  We show in Part IV.A
that generalist courts standing alone are the least successful of the
menu of public institutions that are capable of designing an interpre-
tive regime to protect the rights of the consumer.
Consumers, however, are not the only parties who do not partici-
pate meaningfully in the design of their contracts.  Neither do legally
unsophisticated businesspersons—the archetypical vulnerable party,
central to Llewellyn’s thinking about contract interpretation, whom
175 See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN102.txt unknown Seq: 54 26-NOV-14 14:43
76 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:23
we consider in Part IV.B.  Like the consumer, these parties also do not
carefully design their contracts, even if in a rote way they do choose
the documents.  In this setting, the application of a contextualist inter-
pretive regime as a default rule, with an expert court acting to deter-
mine the context and to devise a complementary understanding of
the parties’ relationship, offers the promise of an effective interpretive
regime.  Unhappily, however, the available evidence suggests that as-
signing that task by default to a generalist court, as the law currently
does, measurably increases the risk of judicial error.
A. An Interpretive Regime for Adhesion Contracts
Here we propose separating consumer contracts from the stan-
dard common law rules of interpretation designed for commercial
parties by first acknowledging that commercial and consumer con-
tracts are different and should be interpreted differently.  We then
relieve generalist courts of the burden of undertaking an unsup-
ported empirical inquiry into context in connection with consumer
contracts.  We argue that it is a category mistake to treat the problem
of exploitation in adhesion contracts176 as a question of contract inter-
pretation.  The assumption that only a pure contextualist approach
can protect the weak against the powerful—as Judge Traynor fa-
mously argued177—underlies the deep resistance of many scholars to
the argument that sophisticated parties should be permitted to choose
for themselves the answers to the questions of who decides when, and
the extent to which, context is considered.  But despite calls for com-
mon law contract rules that equip generalist courts with the tools to
police consumer transactions, no such development has occurred.178
One reason, surely, is that courts are peculiarly ill equipped to the
task.  We argue, therefore, for an interpretive regime that can draw
lines between those transactions in which parties are free to choose
their interpretive styles and those where mandatory regulation of
terms is required to insure fair treatment.
The emerging interpretive regime in the EU offers many of the
elements of a template for crafting a contract design process that sep-
arates agreements deserving special scrutiny from contracts between
legally sophisticated parties.  To safeguard consumers and to assure
176 For the purposes of this Article, we define adhesion contracts broadly to include all
contracts where one party is determined by appropriate state authority to be incapable of
negotiating for contract terms that enhance its interests in the resulting agreement.  That
incapacity might be a function of information asymmetries, high coordination costs, severe
imbalance in bargaining power, or the consequences of recognized cognitive biases.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 44–45. R
178 See Robert A. Hillman, The “New Conservatism” in Contract Law and the Process of Legal
Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879, 882 (1999); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in
Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1133–35 (1995).
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the legal certainty on which commerce depends, the EU has chosen to
separate contracts with consumers from the larger body of general
contract law and to regulate consumer contracts through several di-
rectives harmonizing standards of consumer protection.  The aim is to
establish rules of commercial good conduct in settings in which con-
sumers may be especially vulnerable to exploitation; to ban contract
terms that serve only the interests of one party to the transaction; and
to do this without affecting the contract law that generally governs
agreements between commercial parties.
1. The European Consumer Rights Directive and the Role of the
Courts
Within the EU single market, the fundamental problem of bal-
ancing protection of the contracting parties’ freedom to arrange their
own affairs and protection of the weaker party against imposition of
lopsided bargains is exacerbated by interpretive diversity: the fact that
private law relations “are to a significant extent still governed by na-
tional law,” with the consequence that “the same type of [contractual]
terms may even have different legal effects in different national legal
systems.”179  Hence protections valid in one member state may be un-
recognized in another, to the detriment of the consumer and to the
common market to which the EU is dedicated.  Consumer protection
thus has been an abiding concern in the EU: “[T]here has been no
other area in contract law which has been subject to so much EU legis-
lative influence.”180  This has been addressed by crafting EU directives
that focus on consumer contracts and so trump member state law.
A central element of the EU’s consumer contract interpretive re-
gime is the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.181  It
aims to “facilitate the establishment of the internal market [and] also
to ensure protection for individuals in their capacity as consumers
when they purchase goods or services under a contract.”182  An annex
to the directive contains a nonexhaustive, indicative, “grey” list of sev-
enteen potentially unfair contract terms.183  In order to capture be-
179 A.G. Geelhoed, Opinion in Case C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH
Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v. Ludger Hofstetter, 2004 E.C.R. I-3403, ¶ 30.
180 Norbert Reich, A European Contract Law, or an EU Contract Law Regulation for Con-
sumers?, 28 J. CONSUMER POL. 383, 385 (2005).
181 See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29–34.
182 A.G. Geelhoed, Opinion in Case C-478/99, Comm’n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-4147,
at ¶ 23.
183 The first five entries in the list are:
(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the
event of the death of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting
from an act or omission of that seller or supplier;
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer
vis-a`-vis the seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial
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havior beyond that which is specifically proscribed, a general clause in
article 3(1) defines as unfair any contractual term, not individually
negotiated, that “contrary to the requirement of good faith . . . causes
a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”184  Similarly
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive includes an annex titled
“Commercial Practices Which Are In All Circumstances Considered
Unfair” to the consumer.185  The Doorstep Selling Directive is another
prominent example, addressing the element of surprise in contracts
concluded away from the business premises of the trader, under cir-
cumstances where the consumer, not contemplating a purchase, may
be caught off guard.186  To mitigate the effect of sharp practices it
ensures that the consumer has, and is properly notified of, a seven-day
“cooling-off period,” beginning with receipt of the notice, during
which she has a right of withdrawal from the contract.187
Under EU law, responsibility for determining the unfairness of
terms in particular consumer contracts falls primarily to the courts of
member states, which can make use of the preliminary reference pro-
cedure to pose questions concerning the interpretation of EU law to
the Court of Justice of the European Union.188  For its part, the Court
of Justice has generated a substantial body of case law in its efforts to
reduce ambiguities arising from the unintended effects of the direc-
tives themselves.189  Here, updating is required to protect the legiti-
non-performance or inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of
any of the contractual obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt
owed to the seller or supplier against any claim which the consumer may
have against him;
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of
services by the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realization
depends on his own will alone;
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer
where the latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without
providing for the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent
amount from the seller or supplier where the latter is the party cancelling
the contract;
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a dispro-
portionately high sum in compensation.
Council Directive, supra note 181, Annex, at 33.
184 Council Directive, supra note 181, at 31. R
185 Council Directive 2005/29/EC, Annex I, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 35–37.
186 Council Directive 85/577/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31–33.
187 Id. at 31.
188 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
267, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 164.
189 One ambiguity concerns the rules of civil procedure.  Member states’ procedures
that are unexceptionable in many domains may effectively block consumer access to courts
under circumstances that strip consumers of the protections the directives would offer,
and frustrate the statutory purpose.  Thus in several cases national courts referred to the
Court of Justice the question whether a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the
trader’s legal domicile fell under the prohibition of terms having the effect of “excluding
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mate interests of sellers.  For example, permitting debtors to escape
obligations that they assumed under impermissible conditions may
create a moral hazard risk where debtors are able to escape legiti-
mately incurred debts.  Continuing evaluation of the secondary effects
of the directives is needed to assure that they do not inadvertently
create the very asymmetries in contractual relations they are designed
to mitigate.  Thus, the court has qualified statutory remedies to pre-
vent opportunistic consumers from benefiting to the detriment of ei-
ther other consumers190 or the trader.191  Where the court in the
procedure-related cases based its intervention on the text of the direc-
tive, here it justified its insistence on balance or symmetry in the treat-
ment of the parties on “general principles of civil law.”192
These efforts notwithstanding, there are still important gaps in
the EU regime for consumer contracts.  The most significant is the
absence of a comprehensive and reliable mechanism for updating the
lists of prohibited contract terms provided in various directives.  In
part national courts can keep abreast of relevant changes in commer-
cial practice simply by mutual monitoring of precedential decisions.
But without a mechanism for more systematic, continuing review and
updating there is the risk both that practices threatening consumer
interests diffuse and take hold before they are clearly condemned,
and that commerce is burdened by the enforcement of restrictions
that have lost their relevance to consumer protection.193
or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other remedy.” See
Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Annex. Oce´ano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocio´ Murciano
Quintero, 2000 E.C.R. I-4941; Case C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzse´bet Sustikne´ Gy-
orfi, 2009 E.C.R. I-4713; Case C-137/08, VB Pe´nzu¨gyi Lı´zing Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneider, 2010
E.C.R. I-10888.  The Court of Justice affirmed both the unfairness of the exclusive jurisdic-
tion clause and the obligation of the national courts to consider the pertinence of the
general prohibition in individual cases notwithstanding national procedural rules to the
contrary.  Similarly, the Court of Justice held that doorstep sellers who had not correctly
informed consumers of their rights to withdraw from contracts could not then avail them-
selves of the expiration of the fourteen-day period for withdrawal as a defense against con-
sumers who belatedly sought to exercise these rights. Case C-481/99, Georg Heininger v.
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-9965.  By such decisions the Court of
Justice is fashioning a European “consumer” process law aimed at safeguarding the pur-
poses of the directives.
190 Case C-215/08, E. Friz GmbH v. Carsten von der Heyden, 2010 E.C.R. I-2947.
191 Case C-412/06, Annelore Hamilton v. Volksbank Filder eG, 2008 E.C.R. I-2383.
192 Id.  For some background, see Stephen Weatherill, Note, The ‘Principles of Civil Law’
as a Basis for Interpreting the Legislative Acquis, 6 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 74, 74–77 (2010).
193 Aware of the need to take account of the evolution of unfair practices and also to
protect merchants against excessive regulation, the EU in 2008 incorporated a sophisti-
cated updating mechanism into a proposed revision of Council Directive 93/13/EEC,
supra note 181, and its consolidation with three other directives into a single instrument on R
consumer contractual rights.  Terms used in particular contracts that are perceived as po-
tentially unfair by a court in a member state may be referred to a standing body of experts,
nominated by the member states and chaired by an official of the EU Commission.  This
body would then have decided (subject to override by the European Parliament and the
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In sum, under the current regime the national courts of the
member states play a quasi-administrative function—drawing the at-
tention of home-state regulators to possibly unfair terms.  In turn, the
Court of Justice acts as a judicial backstop, correcting procedural limi-
tations and unintended consequences of the protective framework.
The overall effect is to protect consumers, and by extension other vul-
nerable parties, obligating member states to do a “spring cleaning”194
of their consumer-protection regimes to ensure conformity with the
developing principles of EU law, yet (by reserving application of those
principles to national courts) not unduly unsettling the surrounding
body of national contract doctrine.195  Such an interpretive regime
differs from conventional adjudication in treating each case not only
as a matter of fairness to an individual claimant, but as a potential
indication of systemic failure and an opportunity for improvement
that applies broadly to all consumers in the particular market.  By es-
European Council) whether the challenged term is to be added to the black list of prohib-
ited terms established by Council Directive 93/13/EEC, a new grey list of suspect transac-
tion forms, or, eventually, promoted from the grey to the black list or removed from both.
This mechanism would have enlisted courts in the task of updating the register of imper-
missible terms without empowering the judiciary to routinely question the express mean-
ing of agreements in a way that undercuts the autonomy of sophisticated commercial
parties to design contracts free from such regulation.
But resistance—by the European Parliament to the committee updating procedure
and by consumer groups against corresponding limitations on the right of member states
to supplement EU consumer protections without securing broad approval—doomed this
proposal.  Instead, the Consumer Rights Directive of 2010 merely synthesizes the two direc-
tives on off-premises and on distance contracts. It includes no updating mechanism.
Admittedly, most Committee Members and stakeholders seem to agree with
the aim of harmonising the general clause on unfair contract terms, while
insisting that further assessment is needed. But it is widely believed that
black and grey lists of unfair contract terms should not be harmonised at
this stage in order to avoid negative consequences (deletion of terms from
existing national lists, reduction of the level of legal certainty triggering a
litigation wave throughout the EU, lack of flexibility etc.).  There is consen-
sus that Member States could keep their own lists of unfair contract terms
provided they are consistent with the general clause and Internal Market
rules.
It should however be possible to ban a limited number of unfair contract
terms at EU level and guarantee that Member States cannot maintain or
adopt diverging national provisions in this relatively narrowly harmonised
field. In the light of the principle of full democratic control of the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Commission’s proposal to ban additional unfair terms
through Comitology seems at this point not to constitute the preferred ap-
proach. The new provisions regarding Comitology in the Lisbon Treaty
have to be assessed carefully before deciding on this matter.
EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 2008 614/3-2008/0196 (COD)) 7 (2008), available at http://www
.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef%2F%2FEP%2F%2FNONSGML%2BCOM
PARL%2BPE-439.177%2B02%2BDOC%2BWORD%2BV0%2F%2FEN.
194 Hugh Collins, Harmonisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial
Practices, 73 MODERN L. REV. 89, 92 (2010).
195 For discussion of this “multi-level”—EU and member state—process, see HUGH
COLLINS, THE EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE: THE WAY FORWARD 182–209 (2008).
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tablishing a similar quasi-administrative regime through appropriate
state or federal legislation, American contract law could accomplish
two critically important goals: first, to more effectively and appropri-
ately regulate non-negotiated consumer transactions; and, second, to
free sophisticated commercial parties from constraints that are inapt
to their circumstances.
2. A Common Law Adaptation of the European Model
Consumer-oriented interpretive regimes of this sort also can be
found in U.S. law.  Insurance law is a longstanding example, which
also exhibits flaws and failures over its history.  After a long period in
which generalist judges modified common law doctrines to create, in
effect, a special contract law for insurance, courts responded to the
broad revival of textualist interpretation in recent decades by under-
mining the very doctrinal structure they had created.  But this failure
does not seem to reflect any limit of the common law; rather, as in the
case of EU consumer rights, it points to the need for a stabilizing con-
ception of the relation between generalist courts and the interpretive
regime.
The provision of insurance is highly regulated by the states to
balance the need to safeguard the solvency of insurers with the re-
quirement of broad accessibility of coverage to consumers on fair
terms.  To assure adequate risk pooling and reduce the effects of ad-
verse selection, coverage of certain types of insurance is mandatory.
Thus, all states have compulsory automobile liability insurance in
some form.  To ensure actuarial precision, moreover, terms specifying
the conditions of coverage have to be standardized by statute or regu-
lation across the risk pool, so consumers desiring a particular type of
coverage must accept the terms of the industry standard.  The 1943
New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, for example, is used in
nearly every state and incorporated into the standard homeowner’s
policy.196  To underscore the extreme limitations on consumer choice
in this domain, agreements between insurers and insured have been
called “super-adhesion” contracts.197
In view of pervasive regulation and standardization of insurance,
and the resulting restrictions on the consumer’s capacity to bargain
over terms, courts from roughly the 1960s through the end of the
1980s modified general rules of contract to reach decisions protecting
consumer interests while also creating incentives for insurers and reg-
196 Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 130 (2007).
197 Roger O. Steggerda, Note, Watching Your Neighbor’s Child: Is Babysitting Really a Busi-
ness Pursuit?: A Comment on Dwello v. American Reliance Insurance Company, 1 NEV. L.J.
323, 324 n.14 (2001) (citing JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES
§ 4.06[b], at 4–37).
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ulators to clarify and strengthen the overall regime.198  One of the
most important adjustments of general doctrine was the elaboration
of a strong variant of contra proferentem, under which a court encoun-
tering an ambiguity in an agreement immediately decides for the poli-
cyholder rather than undertaking the usual efforts to determine the
parties’ meaning.199  Another was judicial defense of the policy-
holder’s reasonable expectations of coverage, explicit language in the
agreement notwithstanding.200  As Professor Robert Keeton summa-
rized the doctrine over forty years ago: “The objectively reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the
terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking
study of the policy provisions would have negated those expecta-
tions.”201  Had courts applied these doctrines with consistent rigor,
and had insurers and regulators responded in kind by updating policy
forms in response to the continuing dialogue with courts, the result
would likely have been an ongoing clarification and updating of what
counts as an unambiguous policy term, and what expectations of in-
surance coverage policyholders may reasonably have.202
Unhappily, the courts’ inconsistent protection of reasonable ex-
pectations and their embrace of interpretive rules drawn from com-
mon law contract principles undercut both that doctrine and the
strong form of contra proferentem.  Moreover, the courts’ fitful oversight
of regulators—despite clear authority to hold them to account—and,
most generally, their lack of understanding of the judiciary’s role in
the emergent constellation of insurance law, contributed significantly,
perhaps decisively, to the disorganization of what had been an emer-
gent special-purpose interpretive regime.
This pattern can be seen in the trajectory of the application of
reasonable expectations doctrine to insurance contracts.  The appeal,
but also the limit, of reasonable expectations as a standalone special-
purpose insurance contract doctrine was its generality.  The doctrine,
a creature of the common law, can be applied beyond insurance203 to
198 See Randall, supra note 196, at 109–11.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 111–18.
201 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights as Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 970 (1970).
202 The regulators’ contribution to maintenance of the interpretive regime was no
doubt limited by industry capture of their national association, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).  In recent years approximately half of NAIC’s revenues
come from fees assessed on companies in proportion to the volume of the policies they
write, while less than five percent come from fees assessed by the states.  Susan Randall,
Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 639 (1999).
203 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Rea-
sonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1181–82 (1981); see also Ethan J. Leib,
What is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form Contract?, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOL-
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the vast majority of adhesion contracts to which consumers consent in
mass-market settings.  Indeed, at least one state has already extended
the reasonable expectations doctrine broadly to reach all standard-
form consumer contracts,204 and scholars have generally conceded
that “the doctrine also lacks any principled justification for being lim-
ited to insurance policies.”205  But as the doctrine became untethered
from its original setting in insurance, and as that setting itself changed
in ways that generalist judges could not themselves directly register,
the attractive indeterminacy of the reasonable expectations model in
the setting of an ongoing dialogue between courts and regulators led
to unpredictable decisions (“[t]he opinions speak of expectations
without satisfactorily pointing to their source”206) and judicial error—
the costs of which have arguably been borne by consumers in the
form of higher premiums.207  Thus, many courts have been reluctant
to apply the doctrine except in cases of egregious abuse, and when it
is applied it has been the subject of sustained scholarly criticism.208
Generalist courts have consequently abandoned the understand-
ing of reasonable expectations as a mandate to evaluate the conform-
ity of an agreement to the larger goals of insurance policy regardless
of the clarity of the contractual language; instead they apply the doc-
trine to resolve residual ambiguity.  As the Supreme Court of West
Virginia recently put it: “[I]n West Virginia, the doctrine of reasona-
ble expectations is limited to those instances . . . in which the policy
language is ambiguous.  This Court has explained that [t]he doctrine
of reasonable expectations is essentially a rule of construction, and
unambiguous contracts do not require construction by the courts.”209
With regard to contra proferentem, generalist courts have reverted
in insurance cases to traditional, general contract doctrine.  This turns
the doctrine (back) into a rule of last resort, to be applied against the
drafter only after the usual interpretive means of ascertaining the par-
ties’ intent have failed.  The upshot is that the insurance law regime
adumbrated by Professor Keeton is in disarray.
ARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY 259 (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell & William C. Whitford
eds., 2013).
204 See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2002).
205 W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law
by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 52 (1985).
206 Abraham, supra note 203, at 1163. R
207 See Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable Expectations after Thirty Years:
A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 425, 431–32 (1999).
208 See id.; Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 107,
113–15 (1999); Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1461, 1492 (1989).
209 Jenkins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 632 S.E.2d 346, 352 (W.V. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
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This outcome might have been avoided if courts, instead of re-
imposing general contract doctrines, had instead used their power of
administrative review to induce regulators to seek clarification of in-
surance terms and policies.  In that case the doctrinal adjustments
would have functioned as a judicially administered incentive system—
rewarding clarity achieved by the parties under the regulator’s aegis,
and penalizing failure to achieve this result—rather than as an open-
ended invitation to judges themselves to determine in particular cases
what the parties ought to have intended.  For instance, some codes
obligate the insurance commissioner to disallow a policy form con-
taining or incorporating by reference ambiguous or misleading
clauses; similar statutes mandate disapproval of a form whose provi-
sions are unfair, inequitable, or contrary to the state’s public policy.
Instead of entering into this dialogue with regulators, generalist
courts preferred to defer to the pro forma decisions of regulators, and
treat their assent to forms and policies as an expression of legislative
will, binding the judiciary and the parties to eventual contracts.210
It may be possible to apply the lessons of the EU example and the
rise and decline of the insurance contract law regime to the construc-
tion of a consumer contract regime in the United States even in the
absence of encompassing legislation to that effect.  For example, con-
siderable authority to regulate terms in consumer contracts is cur-
rently embodied in legislation creating the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau as well as in the authority of the Federal Trade
Commission to regulate “unfair trade practices.”211  As the preceding
210 See Randall, supra note 196, at 138.
211 The official website of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) de-
scribes this project in the following terms:
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau will aim to bring clarity to the
marketplace.  A fair, efficient, and transparent market depends upon con-
sumers’ ability to compare the costs, benefits, and risks of different prod-
ucts effectively and to use that information to choose the product that is
best for them.  Fine print and overly long agreements can make it difficult
for consumers to understand and compare products, and that obstacle to
sound markets is not removed by disclosures that are too complicated or
that do not focus on the key information consumers need.  The principal
role of consumer protection regulation in credit markets is to make it easy
for consumers to see what they are getting and to compare one product
with another, so that markets can function effectively.
. . .
The Bureau already has been hard at work attempting to make clarity a
reality.  Early efforts have focused on mortgages and credit cards, but those
are not the only areas in which the Bureau has made progress.
. . .
The CFPB began testing two alternate prototype forms that are designed to
be given to consumers who have just applied for [credit].  This testing—
which will continue in the coming months and involve one-on-one inter-
views with consumers, lenders, and brokers—will precede and inform the
CFPB’s formal rulemaking process.  The CFPB also has posted the proto-
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discussion suggests, the baseline establishing the expectations that are
“reasonable” in any given market cannot come from generalist courts.
The information needed to answer this question can, however, be de-
veloped through the rulemaking process of administrative agencies
charged with the task of regulating transactions in particular markets
and sharpened though interaction with the courts, both in judicial
review of them and in their application.
A particularly salient example of just such a process is the recent
action by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in issuing a
model “plain language” form for credit card contracts.212  Impor-
tantly, use of the model form is not mandatory for banks and other
entities that extend credit to consumers.  Rather, the use of a model
form provides a safe harbor for creditors or lessors.213  Thus, it is con-
ceived as a default from which the regulated entities may depart at
their option.  The objective, then, is not to impose the terms and con-
ditions of credit card contracts but rather to provide a baseline of
“reasonable expectations” against which existing practices can be mea-
sured.  This is the empirical question that courts have been unable to
answer successfully in the insurance context.  What a generalist court
can do better, however, is to assess the facts in individual disputes and
measure the distance between the baseline and the contractual terms
and conditions in the disputed contract.  By engaging in this more
limited role, over time a jurisprudence of legally significant deviations
from the baseline will emerge.  That experience, in turn, would pro-
vide the updating mechanism that permits the relevant agency to re-
vise the baseline in light of the new information revealed in litigation.
In this way, the underlying empirical realities can be revised to better
balance the interests of both the merchant seller and the class of con-
sumers in the particular market being regulated.214
types on its website with an interactive tool to gather public input about the
designs.
. . .
The testing and public feedback process will enable the CFPB to revise the
design and refine the content based on how it works for consumers.  Two
rounds of feedback and revision have occurred so far.  In the first round,
the Bureau received 13,096 comments on the two initial versions of the new
disclosure form.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS REPORT 10–11 (2011),
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf.
212 See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regula-
tion X) and the Truth In Lending Act (Regulation Z), CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/integrated-mortgage-disclosures-under-the-real-es
tate-settlement-procedures-act-regulation-x-and-the-truth-in-lending-act-regulation-z/.
213 See 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (2006) (“A creditor or lessor shall be deemed to be in
compliance with the disclosure provisions . . . if the creditor or lessor . . . uses any appropri-
ate model form or clause as published by the [CFPB].”).
214 In addition, the CFPB urges firms subject to its rules to develop implementation
plans, starting with a “gap analysis to determine what business, operational, and automated
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The model credit card standard form is not an isolated example
of how a consumer contract regime can emerge.  The use of model
terms and conditions as baselines for litigation under the doctrine of
reasonable expectations is an interpretive strategy that easily can be
adopted by other interpretive bodies, in particular the Federal Trade
Commission, that deploy their rule-making authority to develop the
empirical foundation of the standards for fair contracting in other
markets with similar characteristics.215
B. Design Choices and Interpretive Regimes for Legally
Unsophisticated Commercial Parties
We now consider a different group of contracting parties who,
like consumers, have been said to be especially in need of assistance
by generalist courts through contextualist interpretation, but for
starkly different reasons.  This is the world of small business, whose
participants were of special concern to Karl Llewellyn.  These parties
are sophisticated with respect to their businesses; however, they
choose legally unsophisticated contractual arrangements.  The
amount of money at stake in a single transaction typically is too small
to warrant bespoke contracting to create an interpretive regime that a
textualist court should respect.  Nor are dealings homogenous
enough to motivate creation of a detailed industry code and dispute
resolution system.  Hence these parties are drawn to standardized and
prefabricated contracting documents, such as invoices, purchase or-
ders, and acknowledgment forms.  This is the realm, for example, of
the dueling forms problem: where one party’s invitation to a
counterparty to enter a transaction is reflected in one form with at-
tendant boilerplate, while the counterparty agrees to participate
through transmittal of a different form whose attendant boilerplate
differs from the first form in a fashion that turns out to be significant
transaction processes need to change as a result of the new rules[,]” and including proce-
dures for responding to implementation delays, for detecting and correcting infractions of
the new routines, and for keeping senior management and boards abreast of develop-
ments.  Operation of such a (self-correcting) compliance system will mitigate liability for
eventual rule violations. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2013 CFPB DODD-FRANK MORT-
GAGE RULES READINESS GUIDE (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2013
07_cfpb_mortgage-implementation-readiness-guide.pdf; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS:  SUMMER 2013 (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance
.gov/f/201308_cfpb_supervisory-highlights_august.pdf; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
CFPB Bulletin 2013-06: Responsible Business Conduct: Self-Policing, Self-Reporting,
Remediation, and Cooperation (June 25, 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance
.gov/f/201306_cfpb_bulletin_responsible-conduct.pdf.
215 For a similar suggestion, using the Federal Trade Commission to provide the em-
pirical basis for identifying fair terms in consumer contracts, see Ian Ayres & Alan
Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 579–94
(2014).
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ex post.216  In this realm, moreover, as Llewellyn stressed and Stewart
Macaulay later corroborated,217 relationships are often longstanding
and depend importantly on custom, practice, and past course of deal-
ings.218  Under these conditions it is for generalist courts to determine
applicable standards in resolving disputes.
We consider first the more common case in which legally unso-
phisticated commercial contracting parties are poorly served by stan-
dardized contracts inviting contextualization by generalist courts
because, lacking the requisite specialization, such courts will be rela-
tively ineffective at deriving context through the limited sources of
information available in litigation.  The result is a higher incidence of
mistakes, increasing the attraction of informal resolutions compared
to formal resolution.  From this perspective, small business patterns of
relational contracting described by Macaulay flow not only from the
cost of judicial resolution but also from its poor performance.
We then turn to the exceptional outcomes in which a particular
court will have the favorable attributes we have ascribed to early courts
of equity—a deep knowledge of the local community and of the busi-
nesses that come before it—resulting often from geographical con-
centration of industry and therefore cases.219  Such a match between
local courts and local industry provides an effective legal infrastruc-
ture for an industrial district;220 in effect, we see a naturally occurring
interpretive or epistemic community.  In this circumstance, the gener-
alist court acquires the expertise to well serve its litigants—in this re-
gard, it becomes a specialist.
Two examples illustrate the range of conditions favoring this ex-
ceptional outcome.  The first, introduced above, is the Delaware
Chancery Court, a virtual industrial district that allows geographically
dispersed companies to concentrate for purposes of applicable legal
rules and dispute resolution.221  The second is the Santa Clara County
Superior Court, which is the California trial court for much of Silicon
Valley.  Unlike the Delaware Chancery Court, the Santa Clara County
216 For discussion, see SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 41, at 248–78. R
217 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56–62 (1963).
218 For discussion of Llewellyn’s views on custom, see Scott, supra note 43, at 1037–41; R
see also U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (2014) (“[W]ritings are to be read on the assumption that
the course of prior dealings between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for
granted when the document was phrased. . . .  Similarly, the course of actual performance
by the parties is considered the best indication of what they intended the writing to
mean.”).
219 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. R
220 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578 (1999)
(describing the role of law in supporting industrial districts).
221 See supra Part III.C.3.
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Superior Court is generalist in terms of jurisdiction but is specialized
as a result of geographic industrial concentration (rather than the vir-
tual concentration observed in Delaware).222  In these circumstances,
a generalist court is effective because its ongoing dealings with a par-
ticular kind of business may result in specialized expertise.
1. Interpretation of Commercial Contracts Without Ex Ante Design:
The Costs of Using Generalist Courts
Legally unsophisticated commercial parties—the paradigmatic
sales transactions formed by the exchange of standard-form docu-
ments and highlighted by the potential for conflicts between the (du-
eling) forms—are the primary focus of concern in this section.  A
textualist emphasis on the use of merger clauses and plain meaning
interpretation, instead of empowering these parties to actively design
their contract, may force them into an unwanted textualist regime
from which they can opt out only at great cost: the individual transac-
tions can be expected to be too small and to move too quickly to make
costly bespoke contracting feasible.  The problem is not that the par-
ties are unsophisticated about the subject of their contracting.
Rather, these contracts reflect typically short-term interactions.  Cir-
cumstances change between each iteration, and a bespoke contract
that seeks to address anticipated but not predictable changes in speci-
fications, quantity, and price, is well beyond the parties’ capacities to
craft without an investment that is not feasible given the size of the
contract.  A bespoke contract that speaks to only a single transaction
would have to be adjusted, at daunting drafting costs, to then-current
circumstances with each iteration lest in a textualist regime the court
will apply terms that no longer fit.  Moreover, the costs of such adjust-
ment are also high with respect to the time involved to negotiate and
renegotiate the contract.  As Patrick Bolton has shown, the cost of de-
lay when commercial circumstances make speed important raises the
price of the reduced uncertainty associated with ex ante contract
design.223
As we have seen, the cost of updating to reflect changing condi-
tions is not burdensome when the scale of the type of contracting sup-
ports the development of an interpretive regime that collectivizes
both the updating of contract terms and their interpretation.  The
problem in this category of legally unsophisticated commercial con-
222 See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND.
L.J. 1345, 1397 (2012) (describing how “many corporate suits are brought in . . . the Santa
Clara County Superior Court. . . [which] has correspondingly developed considerable fa-
miliarity with corporate cases”).
223 See Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Satisficing Contracts, 77 REV. ECON.
STUD. 937, 948–49, 964 (2010).
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tracting, however, is that the number of parties, their relatively small
size, and the idiosyncrasies of their dealings, makes the development
of an interpretive community of the sort we have examined elsewhere,
such as the cotton market, infeasible.224
But courts applying contextual interpretation to these legally un-
sophisticated parties in areas of geographic concentration of similar
contracting parties can develop both judicial expertise in the subject
matter and a body of precedents that can parallel private interpretive
regimes.225  In effect, in instances such as the Delaware Court of
Chancery and perhaps the Santa Clara County Superior Court with
respect to the Silicon Valley industrial district, we see a type of inter-
pretive regime developing in a form that reflects both the constraints
imposed by the problems of uncertainty and scale that prevent re-
course to either bespoke contracting or a collective interpretive re-
gime, and the potential that generalist courts may become specialist
courts through repeated exposure to the particular industry.  It is the
potential for this form of naturally occurring, judicially based inter-
pretive regime that may have underlain Llewellyn’s willingness to ac-
cept the Uniform Commercial Code’s mandatory contextual
interpretation despite the rejection of the merchant jury.  Under
these circumstances, a generalist court applying contextualist inter-
pretation can well serve a geographic concentration of similar con-
tracting parties—the judicial element of a Marshallian industrial
district.
But what is the fate of legally unsophisticated parties who lack the
scale to create private interpretive regimes and where the levels of
commercial concentration cannot produce judicial expertise and spe-
cialization?  Here the trigger to textualist interpretation (a merger or
integration clause or a facially complete contract) is unlikely to be
present in many cases, and so these parties remain subject to the de-
fault contextualist interpretive style.  Absent the kind of concentration
that allows a generalist court to build knowledge and expertise, and
given the lack of scale and the barriers of cost, generalist courts will be
the only formal—although ineffective—method of dispute resolution,
but the risk of mistake resulting from lack of specialized experience
224 For a discussion of the interpretive regime that regulates disputes in the cotton
market, see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 13, at 202–05. R
225 For discussion of these “network externalities,” see Klausner, supra note 173, at R
772–825; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “the Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 729–40 (1997). For exam-
ple, consider the negotiation of an acquisition agreement when the acquiring company has
a short exclusivity period during which the target company will not entertain competing
bids.  In this circumstance, the delay associated with negotiating bespoke, precise terms
may impose high costs not through legal fees to draft them but through the loss of valuable
time to get a deal done within the exclusivity period.
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will push the parties toward informal methods.  In those circum-
stances, where general courts applying contextual interpretation will
perform least well, we would expect they would be resorted to less
frequently.226
The heightened risk of error by a generalist court seeking the
relevant contractual context is a function of two core problems.  The
first is the growing evidence that, even in a stable world, custom and
practice do not tend toward the kind of equilibria that can be cap-
tured in a rule, and that in a world of uncertainty even such jittery
constancy as exists in commercial practice in quiet environments is
constantly changing in response to exogenous and endogenous fac-
tors.227  In short, there may not be any stable custom or usage for the
court to find as a fact as the legal doctrine currently assumes can be
done.228  While intimate familiarity with the evolving commercial
practice may permit an expert court, such as the Delaware Court of
Chancery, to reliably recover the always evolving contextual facts
needed to resolve fiduciary duty disputes, generalist courts are denied
access to such specialized knowledge.  Second, and perhaps for the
foregoing reasons, there is growing evidence that generalist courts do
not even try to find the relevant custom and usages.  This evidence
suggests that many courts, lacking expertise, rely on interested party
testimony and unsupported assumptions of reasonable commercial
behavior rather than a careful evaluation of complex evidentiary
submissions.229
There is some modest evidence that generalist courts are begin-
ning to shape legal doctrine in response to the heightened risk of
error in unfocused explorations of context.  For example, under New
York law a court is permitted under limited circumstances to allow use
of context evidence to show that language that appears to have a plain
meaning in fact has a different trade usage, even where the trigger to
textualism is otherwise met.230  But here, the courts limit the breadth
226 See generally Iva Bozovic & Gillian K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to
Build Informal Relations in Support of Innovation (Univ. of S. Cal. Law & Econ. Research
Paper, No. C12-3, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1984915 (studying interpretive structures through interviews with a group of firms that use
formal contracts only to reinforce informal modes of enforcement).
227 See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 160, at R
1743–44, 1775–76 (discussing the interaction of exogenous factors and endogenous shad-
ing responses by the parties).
228 Craswell, supra note 20, at 118. R
229 Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts, supra note 18, at 14–18. R
230 See Law Debenture Trust Co. v. Maverick Tube Corp., 595 F.3d 458, 465–68 (2d Cir.
2010); British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., 342 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2003)
(stating that “the advocate of the trade usage must establish either that the party sought to
be bound was aware of the custom, or that the custom’s existence was ‘so notorious’ that it
should have been aware of it” (quoting Reuters Ltd. v. Dow Jones Telerate, Inc., 662
N.Y.S.2d 450, 454 (1st Dep’t 1997))).  This limited incursion on the plain meaning rule is
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of any ex post resort to context.  To defeat the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of a party relying on the plain meaning of contractual
terms, the court in effect requires the equivalent of trade association
specifications.  The party urging that terms have a specialized industry
meaning must meet a very high standard to avoid summary judgment:
“[P]roof of custom and usage consists of proof that the language in
question is ‘fixed and invariable’ in the industry in question.”231  The
trade usage must be “‘so well settled, so uniformly acted upon, and so
long continued as to raise a fair presumption that it was known to
both contracting parties and that they contracted in reference
thereto.’”232  For our purposes, note the safety valve that releases
contextualist interpretation explicitly looks to the central characteris-
tic of an industrial district: scale, with the actions of many small con-
tracting parties giving rise to the clear patterns of meaning that
Llewellyn had in mind.233
In sum, smaller parties who sensibly, albeit sometimes intuitively
rather than analytically, reject an invitation to engage in contract de-
sign likely will confront courts considering context ex post, a form of
interpretive regime that fits the parties’ contracting conditions.  For
also available to sophisticated commercial parties. See Law Debenture Trust, 595 F.3d at
471–72 (addressing the question of whether the term “common stock” included arguably
functionally similar American depositary receipts).
231 Law Debenture Trust, 595 F.3d at 466 (quoting Hutner v. Greene, 734 F.2d 896, 900
(2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Belasco Theatre Corp. v. Jelin Prods., Inc., 59 N.Y.S.2d 42, 45
(App. Div. 1945))). Belasco goes on to state that “[a] custom, in order to become part of a
contract, must be so far established and so far known to the parties, that it must be sup-
posed that their contract was made in reference to it.  For this purpose the custom must be
established, and not casual, uniform and not varying, general and not personal, and known
to the parties.” Belasco, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (quoting Sipperly v. Stewart, 50 Barb. 62 (1867)).
232 Law Debenture Trust, 595 F.3d at 466 (quoting Seguros La Republica, 342 F.3d at 84
(quoting Reuters, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 454)).
233 A final category of legally unsophisticated commercial parties involve transactions
where the parties mistakenly use standard forms that on their face reflect a textualist de-
sign choice, manifested by a merger clause and a hard parol evidence rule, and so trigger
textualist interpretation (and where observable industry standards as just described do not
provide a way out).  Here there is a real question of whether the category includes mean-
ingful numbers of contracting parties, and whether providing recourse to context actually
would help these firms. We are skeptical that there are significant numbers of smaller
business entities that use form contracts containing a merger or integration clause without
in fact knowing what they are doing; rather, the large majority of firms fall in the first
category where uncertainty and scale lead to contracts to which either textualist interpreta-
tion would not apply or, subject to a high standard of proof, resort to industry standards is
still possible.  Moreover, even with respect to the number of parties that do misuse
standard-form documents, we believe that contextualist interpretation by a generalist court
absent geographical concentration is likely to yield even worse results.  In this setting, the
court confronts what is basically a standard-form contract.  The generalist court has no
guidance concerning what context is relevant other than the parties’ instrumental asser-
tions at the time of litigation.  Thus, the likelihood of moral hazard inducing error is high.
As a result, contracting parties will have an incentive to develop relational-based con-
tracting, as Macaulay, supra note 217, describes, because a generalist court will be error R
prone.
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these parties, the resulting increase in back-end enforcement costs is
preferable to the alternative of incurring the even larger increase in
the front-end costs of ex ante design.  And in those circumstances
where courts do not have the specialized local knowledge of the early
courts of equity, we can expect the parties to minimize the role of
inexperienced generalist courts by relying more heavily on relationally
based enforcement.
2. The Return of Equity: Expert Courts as Interpretive Regimes
While LLCs and other organizational forms like limited partner-
ships are used by legally sophisticated parties as both the basis for
large private equity and venture capital funds and in some cases as a
vehicle for public investment,234 a very large number of privately held
businesses whose participants are legally unsophisticated contract with
each other over the terms of their organizational relationship through
the corporation’s articles of incorporation or, for LLCs, through the
operating agreement.235  As we will see, judicial specialization appro-
priately addresses the interpretive problem associated with the con-
tract design that establishes an organization.
Situating the relationship of the corporate law of small privately
held corporations within contending interpretive approaches in con-
tract law requires a little history.  The attraction of corporate organiza-
tion to small business people is that the corporate form typically will
shield shareholder-owners from personal liability for the debts of the
corporation whether in tort or contract.236  But what governs the rela-
tions among the participants in the corporation?  Typically, the
“form” contract was reflected in the corporation’s articles of incorpo-
234 See Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evi-
dence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 567 (2012) (describing sample
of publicly traded limited partnerships and LLCs).
235 Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contract in Dela-
ware’s Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 789, 801–02 (2008).  In Delaware, for example, from 2005 through 2009, the number of
LLCs created exceeded the number of ordinary corporations created from 256% to 313%,
and since 1992 when the Delaware LLC statute was adopted, more LLCs were created than
all other types of business entities combined. Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for
LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 200 (2011).
The growth in LLCs relative to other organizational forms is not limited to Delaware. See
Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of
New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States between 2004–2007 and How LLCs
were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 459–60 (2010)
(finding that the formation of new LLCs outpaces the formation of new corporations na-
tionwide by a nearly 2-to-1 margin).
236 See e.g., Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability for Supervi-
sion and Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
1661, 1696 (2010) (“[T]he principle of limited liability[ ] . . . restricts shareholders’ per-
sonal liability for the debts and liabilities of the corporation to the extent of their invest-
ment and insulates corporate agents from contractual claims.”).
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ration and bylaws, and sometimes in a shareholders’ agreement.  As
with smaller commercial parties contracting among themselves di-
rectly, these owners often did not address the range of state contin-
gencies that might leave some of the owners subject to opportunistic
behavior as facts replaced expectations with the passage of time.237  A
standard pattern was that a controlling owner and a minority owner
would extract the return on their investment through their employ-
ment by the corporation.  Subsequently, the controlling shareholder
used standard corporate law rules to terminate the employment of the
minority owner and so drastically reduced the value of the minority
stake.238
In general, courts responded to these smaller-scale intra-corpo-
rate contracting issues through the application of a broad standard
and the resulting contextual interpretation.  This was accomplished in
close corporations by the proposition that shareholders in a close cor-
poration owed each other a fiduciary duty, whose measure was the
shareholders’ “reasonable expectations” determined through the
court’s parsing of the testimony.239  What remained unclear in this
parallel contractual regime is whether the use of a broad standard of
contextual interpretation was a default or, as in the case of the general
contextualist position, mandatory.
Recent events in Delaware provide a nice account of this tension.
In 1993, Delaware rejected the position, commonplace in other juris-
dictions, that shareholders in a close corporation owed each other a
special fiduciary duty measured by entire fairness.240  However, Dela-
ware also treats general fiduciary duty in corporations, as opposed to a
special close-corporation fiduciary duty, as mandatory and not subject
to waiver.241  This outcome, though, does not extend to alternative
forms of entities, like limited partnerships and LLCs.  A series of stat-
utes and court decisions resulted in the clear position that Delaware
237 The drafting costs, which are significant given the small scale of the businesses of
concern here, are made worse by the issue of whether a single lawyer can address both
parties in negotiating the corporate documents or operating agreements given that the
parties will have conflicting interests along some dimensions.  For example, California
Rule of Professional Conduct 3-310(C) requires a lawyer to secure “informed consent” of
each person when she represents all of the parties forming a small business. CAL. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-310(C) (2008).  New York Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 is to
similar effect. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009).
238 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E. 2d 505, 513–15 (Mass. 1975)
(describing how majority stockholders attempt “freeze-outs” to oppress or disadvantage
minority stockholders).
239 See JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS 790–96 (8th ed. 2013) (surveying cases and commentary).
240 See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1375–79 (Del. 1993).
241 See, e.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 851 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(describing how, in the corporate context, general fiduciary duties may not be waived).
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limited partnerships and LLCs can alter or entirely eliminate fiduciary
duty or replace it with such contractual provisions as they saw fit.242
This left open the critical issue from our perspective: What was
the interpretive default rule—a contextualist fiduciary duty standard
or a textualist’s examination of the entity’s organizational documents?
The issue was especially important in Delaware because it was appar-
ent that Delaware had a mixture of sophisticated and unsophisticated
users of LLCs, but with the majority in the sophisticated category.  As
of the end of 2010, 550,238 LLCs had been organized in Delaware,
including 82,207 in 2010 alone. The population in Delaware at the
close of 2010 was 897,934.243  Most of the Delaware LLCs therefore
were organized on behalf of people outside of Delaware, the choice of
an organization state other than the organizers’ home state itself be-
ing a fair signal of sophistication.
Consistent with our discussion of how a contextually informed
court can and should protect the interests of legally unsophisticated
commercial parties, the Delaware Chancery Court concluded in
Auriga Capital Corporation v. Gatz Properties, LLC, that fiduciary duty ap-
plied as a default in LLCs unless the entity’s organizational documents
modified or eliminated it.244  This led to a moderately unseemly ex-
change between the Chancellor of Delaware and the Chief Justice of
the Delaware Supreme Court.  The Chief Justice, in a law review arti-
cle written before the Auriga decision, had strongly advocated for a
default rule that eliminated fiduciary duty—if legally unsophisticated
parties wanted fiduciary duties, they should have to say so.245  The
Chancellor was not convinced.  In a lengthy opinion the Chancellor
adopted the contextualist default rule, leaving it to legally sophisti-
cated parties to opt out through their drafting of the organizational
documents.246
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion
concluded that the Chancellor’s discussion in Auriga was dicta (an ar-
guable position) and chastised him for addressing the issue at all: “[I]t
was improvident and unnecessary for the trial court to reach out and
decide, sua sponte, the default duty fiduciary issue as a matter of statu-
242 The story, involving repeated interaction between the chancery and the supreme
court that was finally resolved by the Delaware legislature, is recounted in CHOPER, COFFEE
& GILSON, supra note 239, at 816–22.  The alternative entities cannot, however, waive the R
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.
243 Mohsen Manesh, What is the Practical Importance of Default Rules Under Delaware LLC
and LP Law?, 2 HARVARD BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 121, 128 n.32 (2012), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1991190.
244 See 40 A.3d at 849–56.
245 See Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 233–42 (2009).
246 See Auriga, 40 A.3d at 849–56.
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tory construction.”247  The supreme court then went on, itself in
(quite pointed) dicta, to set out the Chief Justice’s side of the argu-
ment.248  The matter finally was resolved in favor of the Chancellor by
the Delaware legislature—the default rule was fiduciary duty.249  Put
in our terms: text and context.  Legally unsophisticated parties could
not take advantage of the Delaware LLC statute’s invitation to elect a
textualist regime—uncertainty and scale made the drafting task infea-
sible.  The result was an outcome in this contracting context consis-
tent with what we present here: parties are empowered to design their
LLC contract, but smaller-entity owners—the corner grocery store as
opposed to the venture capital fund—are protected by a contextualist
default rule that specifies a standard whose satisfaction is determined
by an expert court—the Delaware Court of Chancery.
247 Gatz Props., LLC, v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1218 (Del. 2012) (per
curiam).
248 See id. at 1218–22.
249 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1104 (West 2013) (“In any case not provided for in this
chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduci-
ary duties and the law merchant, shall govern.”).
Independent of the merits of the particular controversy, the dispute between the
chancery court and the supreme court recalls the tension between law and equity re-
counted in Part II above.  The chancery court chooses to protect its recourse to context—
the application of its specialized expertise to make a standard viable in the face of signifi-
cant uncertainty.  The supreme court sounds more like a law court.  This is not the first
time that the chancery court and the supreme court have faced off in a fashion that recalls
the tension between equity and law, albeit internal to the Delaware judicial system (the
Delaware Chancery Court is explicitly a court of equity; the Delaware Supreme Court, of
course, is not).
A similar tension has existed between the chancery court and the supreme court for
twenty-three years and over the terms of three successive chancellors over whether the
ability of a target board of directors to decline to remove a poison pill blocking sharehold-
ers from deciding whether to accept a hostile takeover would be resolved through detailed
examination of the context of the transaction as advocated by the three chancellors, or by
a rule-like approach that gives great deference to the target, as adopted by the supreme
court. See CHOPER, COFFEE & GILSON, supra note 239, at 980. The character of the equity R
versus law tension appears from Chancellor Chandler’s comment in a case decided just
prior to his retirement:
Although I have a hard time believing that inadequate price alone (accord-
ing to the target’s board) in the context of a non-discriminatory, all-cash,
all-shares, fully financed offer poses any ‘threat’—particularly given the
wealth of information available to Airgas’s stockholders at this point in
time—under existing Delaware law, it apparently does. . . .  In my personal
view, Airgas’s poison pill has served its legitimate purpose.
Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 56–57 (Del. Ch. 2011).  Justice Jack
Jacobs, who has seen this tension from both the perspective of sitting on the chancery
court and on the supreme court, compares the tension to that between law and equity in
seventeenth-century England—like we do.  Jack B. Jacobs, The Uneasy Truce Between Law and
Equity in Modern Business Enterprise Jurisprudence, 8 DEL. L. REV. 1, 9, 13 (2005).
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CONCLUSION
The battle over the generalizability of competing contract proto-
types has been fueled by competing ideas of the nature of the decision
process that gives rise to a contract and how that should guide its in-
terpretation.  For textualists, the allocation to the parties to decide
who chooses the mix of text and context and when that choice is best
made is the expression of intent of an autonomous agent, who can,
with the help of legal counsel, articulate its aims and anticipate its
most advantageous reactions to contingencies.  For contextualists, the
interpretive choice always contains an irreducibly social component:
individual intentions, and the associated expectations of others, are
always enmeshed in a web of common understandings and a shared,
practical sense of mutual obligation.  It is as impossible as it is unnec-
essary to articulate them fully: impossible because the understandings
and obligations are tacit and resist explication; unnecessary because
they are widely shared, and so are typically available as guides to ac-
tion even when they cannot be fully articulated.
By examining the array of interpretive regimes that occupy the
contracting design space we see the limitations of both conceptions.
The textualist understanding of the exercise of ex ante choice as
freestanding, articulate, and prescient cannot make sense of the in-
creasing intrusion of uncertainty into the familiar world of probabilis-
tic contingencies, and with it the spread of forms of collaborative
contracting: here sophisticated parties encounter the limits of presci-
ence, seeking in collaboration the possibility of gradually articulating
intentions, most directly by joint learning from a context jointly cre-
ated.  Conversely, the manifest inability of generalist courts in a dy-
namic society to construe evanescent commercial practices, and the
growing realization that even in steady times customary rules do not
emerge spontaneously from practice, exposes the limits of the contex-
tualist understanding of shared norms discovered by ex post adjudica-
tion.  Where textualists are driven to explore forms of sociability
broadly associated with contextualism, contextualists are driven to en-
quire into the design of institutions capable of articulating, at least
partly, tacit understandings, making them more accessible to the kind
of deliberate control broadly associated with textualism.  Both must
acknowledge dependence, in many settings, on a wide range of inter-
pretive regimes—public and private—that function as complements
to common law adjudication rather than as antagonists.
There is no reason to think that the differences in textualist and
contextualist positions will disappear fully over time, or that a conver-
gence in the concepts of ex ante choice and ex post adjudication will
lead ultimately to a novel synthesis.  Nor should this be a cause for
regret. We have no more need for a unified idea of  “who decides”
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than for a unified concept of contract to respond effectively to the
diverse settings in which we transact.  But perhaps it is not too much
to expect that careful attention to the wide variety of contracting prac-
tices will further weaken the grip of textualism and contextualism as
the master ideas of doctrine and legal imagination.  And that atten-
tion may also help clear the way for more practically supportive appre-
ciation for innovations in contract design, surprising judicial successes
such as the revival of “traditional” courts of equity, and the role of
interpretive regimes, established and emergent, in the resolution of
contract disputes.
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